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INTRODUCTION 
The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 has highlighted the importance of accurate 
credit risk estimation. What had started with the collapse of a few credit institutions in 
the United States, ended with deeply negative effects on the global credit derivative 
market. Investors, who had protected their bonds against an event of default with credit 
default swaps, never thought the protection wouldn’t be able to meet investor’ needs 
due to the incompetent risk assessment by the swap issuers. Nevertheless, the credit 
default swap market has grown steadily after the financial crisis in line with the growth 
of bond market, requiring investors to precisely assess the credit risk in the underlying 
bonds. A better understanding of the underlying credit risk on the market is not only 
important for the risk management of bond portfolios as well as pricing of credit 
derivatives and risky debt, but also useful for the central bankers to assess the 
functioning of the financial market to extract more precise information about the market 
sentiment. 
The great deal of credit risk underestimation during the global financial crisis of 2008-
2009 has forced the practitioners to reexamine the underlying credit risk on the market. 
In this light, the investor’s risk sentiment after the global financial crisis needs to be 
assessed. The strong relationship between bond credit spreads (the yield difference 
between the equivalent corporate bonds and government bonds) and credit default swap 
spreads gives ground to examine investor’s over- or underestimation of credit risk 
during the period of economic recovery until the first quarter of 2015. On one side, the 
credit risk is priced by banks (credit default swaps) and on the other side the credit risk 
is priced by investors (bonds). Thus the adequate risk estimation is not only important 
for the investors, but for the whole economy as well. Serious credit risk perception 
differences might increase the exposure of one party to a great extent during a credit 
event or an economic crisis.  
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The main objective of the thesis is to find evidence to investor’s credit risk 
underestimation by comparing model estimated credit default swap spreads to actual 
credit default swap spreads. The model estimated credit default swap spreads are based 
on bond spreads, which is an important indicator of investors’ risk sentiment. 
In order to reach the main objective, six research tasks are formed. The following tasks 
complement the finding of the main objective by helping to give a better structural 
overview of the paper. The research tasks are as follows: 
1. To give a comparative overview of high grade and low grade bonds; 
2. To explain the concept of a credit default swap and to differentiate between the 
various credit default swap pricing models; 
3. To summarize the methods and results for analyzing credit spreads and to 
review literature on investor’s credit risk underestimation; 
4. To explain the market background and to give an overview of the companies 
included in the analysis; 
5. To analyze model estimated and actual credit default swap spreads across three 
industry sectors in the Nordic countries; 
6. To summarize the results and to give concluding remarks. 
The sample includes 16 companies from the Nordic countries, which have been divided 
into three industry sectors, of which two are investment grade and one is sub-investment 
grade. The time period during which the analysis is conducted spans from January 2010 
to March 2015. Each company included in the analysis has at least three outstanding 
bonds during the previously mentioned time period. 
The daily bond spread and credit default swap spread data used in the thesis is acquired 
from Bloomberg database. Bloomberg database is an online database providing current 
and historical financial quotes, macroeconomic data, business news, descriptive 
information, research and statistics on over six million financial instruments across all 
asset classes. The access to Bloomberg database is granted through dedicated terminals. 
Credit default swap (CDS) is an over-the-counter bilateral agreement designed to 
transfer the risk between two parties. Credit default swaps are bought by investors 
(protection buyer) from banks (protection seller) to protect against a default or a similar 
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credit event of the bond issuing corporation (reference entity). CDSs deliver a 
significant value to the global economy and they have created a liquid marketplace for 
trading or offsetting credit risk. 
The relationship between bond credit spreads and credit default swap spreads, including 
their pricing, has been previously explored by several studies (Blanco et al 2005, Zhu 
2006, Galil et al 2014). The main results have concluded that a strong relationship 
exists between the two, with credit default swaps often leading the bond spreads. 
Although the results might differ between investment grade and sub-investment grade 
bonds, the variation is insignificant for the sake of this analysis. 
A few limitations to this paper exist. Initially the sample period was supposed to span 
for 11 years, from January 2005 to March 2015. The extended period would have 
included the credit default market situation and risk perception before, during, and after 
the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, but due to the lack of available bond spread 
data for the companies originating from the Nordic countries, the sample period was 
shortened to the latest five years. Also the credit default swap estimation is based solely 
on bond spreads and recovery rate, due to which a simplified model for the estimation is 
used. The future researches could involve a larger scope of industry sectors during a 
longer time period for an even more profound study. 
The main part of the thesis is split into two parts: theoretical and empirical. The 
theoretical part itself consists of three sub-chapters, which give an overview, explore 
and analyze the different concepts of credit default swaps, bonds and credit risk found 
in the scientific literature. Section 1.1 discusses the characteristics of high grade and 
low grade bonds and brings out their differences. The literature on credit default swaps 
and the pricing models are reviewed in section 1.2. The section also shows how the two 
forms of credit default swap pricing models are formulated. In section 1.3, the previous 
studies in the field of credit risk and its underestimation are reviewed. In addition, an 
overview of the time period sub-samples used by different authors is given. 
The empirical part of the thesis is also split into three sub-chapters. Section 2.1 
describes the market background, which is relevant for the better understanding of the 
analysis. Also a descriptive overview of the countries and the companies included in the 
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analysis is presented. This is followed by section 2.2, which breaks down the model 
used to estimate credit default swap spreads. After that, the time series are tested for 
unit root and cointegration, which are the immediate prerequisites for the vector error-
correction model used establish long term relationships between the actual and 
estimated credit default swap spreads. In section 2.3 the results of the analysis are 
presented, including the detailed interpretation of results across the three industry 
sectors: industrials, paper & pulp and utilities. 
Main part of the thesis is interconnected, e.g. the theoretical part helps to understand the 
topic’s background and gives insight to empirical analysis. The results are also bound to 
theoretical framework and help to extend the credit default swap and credit risk research 
further. The thesis ends with conclusion, which is followed by a list of references and a 
summary in Estonian. 
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1. A THEORETICAL OVERVIEW OF BONDS, CREDIT 
SPREAD AND THE PRICING OF CREDIT DEFAULT 
SWAPS 
 
1.1. Bonds and their most common characteristics 
Today, in the low interest rate economic environment, the interest rates are so low that 
investing in “safe” government bonds might not yield more than a few basis points. For 
example, German government bonds currently yield a negative percent on their 2-year 
and 5-year bonds1. The current economic situation forces investors to search for higher 
yield. More investors turn their eyes to corporate bonds, especially high yield bonds, 
which bear a greater risk than government bonds or investment grade bonds, but also 
grant a much higher yield. The following chapter gives a comprehensive understanding 
of corporate bonds and explains their different characteristics. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (What Are Corporate … 2013: 1-2) 
defines corporate bonds as debt obligations, which are issued by corporations and sold 
to different investors. In return, the corporation makes a legal commitment to pay 
investors interest and the principal, i.e. the original amount of debt issued. Based on 
their credit ratings, bonds are usually divided into investment grade and non-investment 
grade bonds. Investment grade bonds are regarded as more likely to pay on time than 
non-investment grade. In return, non-investment grade bonds offer a higher interest rate 
in order to compensate the higher risk. Table 1.1 gives an overview of the rating 
structure of the most common rating agencies. 
  
                                                 
1
 Based on data from Bloomberg, on 17.04.2015 German Government 2 year bond yielded  
-0.27% and 5 year bond -0.16%. 
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Table 1.1. Bond rating structure and rating transformation to cardinal value. 
 
Rating classification Standard & Poor's Moody's Fitch Cardinal 
value 
Investment grade 
Highest grade AAA Aaa AAA 1 
High grade AA+, AA, AA- Aa1, Aa2, Aa3 AA+, AA, AA- 2, 3, 4 
Upper medium grade A+, A, A- A1. A2. A3 A+, A, A- 5, 6, 7 
Medium grade BBB+, BBB, BBB- Baa1, Baa2, Baa3 BBB+, BBB, BBB- 8, 9, 10 
Speculative grade 
Lower medium grade BB+, BB, BB- Ba1, Ba2, Ba3 BB+, BB, BB- 11, 12, 13 
Speculative B+, B, B- B1, B2, B3 B+, B, B- 14, 15, 16 
Poor standing CCC+, CCC, CCC- Caa1, Caa2, Caa3 CCC 17, 18, 19 
Highly speculative CC Ca CC 20 
Lowest quality C C C 21 
In default D N/A DDD/DD/D 22 
Source: (Wang and Zhang 2014: 800). 
Corporate bonds are usually trading at a premium (depending on coupon rate and yield 
to maturity), which compensates the bond buyer for the comparatively higher credit risk 
compared to a low-risk government bonds. Government bonds are issued by a national 
government and provide a guaranteed return. Both corporate bonds and government 
bonds are subject to political risk. Political risk is the risk that arises as a result of the 
potential actions of governments and other political forces within and across nations. 
(Huang et al 2014: 1) In addition to corporate bond yields, such uncertainty also affects 
the government bond yields, meaning countries with higher political risk (e.g. Russia) 
have a higher yield than countries with low political risk (e.g. Sweden, Germany). 
Non-investment grade bonds, better known as high-yield bonds, are bonds with credit 
ratings below BBB- (S&P) or Baa3 (Moody’s). Essentially they are a combination of 
equity and riskless bonds. The reason high-yield bonds offer a greater return than 
riskless bonds is that they include the risk of default associated with equities. Thus, the 
credit risk of high-yield bonds is more compensated for by their higher yields. (Tuysuz 
2013: 29) High-yield bonds are usually issued by companies which are smaller in size, 
act in an uncertain environment or are not rated by a credit rating company (e.g. 
Moody’s, S&P, Fitch). As investment grade corporate bonds have been issued for more 
than a century now, the modern high-yield bond market is a relatively new asset class. 
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The high-yield bond market first emerged in the late 1970s and since then has 
experienced strong but cyclical growth (Reilly et al 2009: 66). 
Corporate bonds either have a floating or fixed interest rate. Fixed interest rate bonds 
pay the same amount of interest for its entire term. Floating interest rate means that the 
bond has a variable interest rate and it’s tied to a benchmark such as the U.S. Treasury 
bill rate, Libor, Euribor etc. Compared to fixed rate bonds, floating rate protects 
investors against a rise in interest rates. When the interest rates are stable, it generally 
doesn’t matter whether bonds are issued with floating or fixed interest rate, because 
short term they both roughly yield similarly. Leveraged Finance News (2014) state that 
until recently high-yield bonds have had trouble competing with loans because investors 
fear that rising interest rates might make bond’s interest rate unattractive. Thus more 
bonds are being issued with floating interest rate, tied to Libor or Euribor. Floating rate 
bonds usually yield less than comparable fixed-rate bonds which means investors are 
compensated less for the additional risk. 
When bond trading occurs on the secondary market, higher bond liquidity helps 
investors to sell and buy holdings faster and at an equitable price. In short, liquidity of 
bonds is the ease with which bonds can be sold or bought in the secondary market. 
Illiquidity happens when there is a lack of sufficient number of buyers and sellers at a 
preferable price or in a timely manner. (Understanding liquidity … 2015) Thus the 
illiquidity of corporate bonds has captured the interest and attention of numerous 
researchers and practitioners, especially after the financial crisis of 2008 where both 
credit risk and illiquidity intensified at the same time, making it difficult trade bonds. 
In their research paper, assessing the illiquidity of corporate bonds, Bao et al (2011: 
941-942) concluded the main reasons for bond illiquidity. In particular, bond illiquidity 
increases with a bond’s age and maturity, and decreases with its issuance size. 
Illiquidity of individual bonds can fluctuate substantially over time and during a market 
wide illiquidity, periods of market turmoil such as market crises or major bankruptcies, 
the illiquidity increases sharply. The history has also shown that high yield bonds are 
generally less liquid that investment grade bonds due to smaller issue size and higher 
risks. Another frequently used measure to calculate illiquidity is the effective bid-ask 
spread, although it does not fully capture many important aspects of liquidity such as 
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market depth and resilience (Bao et al 2011: 913). Bid-ask spread is the difference in 
bond’s price between the buyers willingness to pay and the sellers willingness to sell. 
The bigger the bid-ask spread, the more illiquid is the bond. 
Volatility reflects the expectations and fears of the market, mainly proving to be the one 
of the most important determinants of asset value for stocks and bonds. Volatility refers 
to the amount of risk or uncertainty in the bond’s value. A higher volatility means that a 
bond is trading at a wider range of prices which means over a short time period it can 
change dramatically in either direction. The main cause of the volatility is the flow of 
asymmetrical information and its impact on the investors’ perceptions about the risks 
and prices of bonds (Zhou 2014: 216). Reilly et al (2010: 179-180) suggest that high 
yield bonds are more volatile than investment grade bonds due to their wider credit risk 
spread. Specifically, the price of the high yield bonds is subject to change more 
frequently than safer, investment grade bonds. Because high yield bonds provide much 
higher yield depending on the market situation, investors suddenly showing more 
interest in high yield bonds can push the volatility higher and widens the price range. 
It’s not uncommon that during recessions sharp increases in volatility coincide with 
spikes in default rates. In 2008 high volatility led bond spreads to explode, as BB-rated 
bonds peaked at 1,250 basis points (bps), B-rated bonds at 1,800 bps and CCC-rated 
bonds at 2,800 bps (Reilly et al 2009: 65). Analysis of the volatility for high yield bonds 
has shown that during periods of stability in the economy and financial markets, the 
volatility is very similar to investment grade bonds. During economic or political 
uncertainty, the volatility of high yield bonds becomes two or three times greater than 
the volatility of investment grade bonds, showing similar levels as common stocks. The 
biggest impact to high yield bond volatility comes from CCC-rated bonds, whose risk of 
default becomes fairly significant during economic recessions. (Reilly et al 2009: 76-
77) These findings confirm that there is a consistently strong relationship of changes in 
volatility with the economy, as volatility peaks during economic recessions and stays 
relatively low during economic upturn. 
The valuation of bonds plays an important role when investors or fund managers buy 
securities. One way is to compare the yield spreads of different bonds, to determine best 
value for money. Yield spread, commonly known as credit spread, is a compound of 
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yield and spread. Yield describes how much money as interests or dividends investors 
can earn from a security and spread describes how wide or narrow a distribution is. 
High-yield bond spread is defined by Investopedia (2015) as the percentage difference 
in current yields of various classes of high-yield bonds compared against investment-
grade bonds, government bonds or another benchmark bond measure. The spreads are 
usually expressed as a difference in percentage points or basis points. 
Like any other investment, bonds involve different risks. The higher the risk, the higher 
is the variance in spread. Main factors causing variance in spread can be divided into 
company-specific and environmental variables. Company-specific variables include, 
among others, rating, seniority, term, callability, and zero-coupon status. Environmental 
variables are spread versus government bonds, yield curve, default rate, interest rate 
changes, and high yield returns. (Fridson, Bersh 1998: 29) The biggest risk, in the eyes 
of the investors, is default/credit risk. Altman and Bana (2004) define bond’s default as 
a bond issuer’s inability to pay their interest coupon payments on time, announcement 
of a distressed restructuring (usually offering the investor a lower interest rate or an 
extension of the period for payment), or filing for bankruptcy. When default occurs, 
there is a chance that investors won’t get the principal back in the full amount. 
In the event of default, the amount of principal which can be recovered is known as 
recovery rate. The term “recovery” can either refer to the price of the bonds at the time 
of default or to their value at the end of the distress period (Altman and Kishore, 1996: 
57). The amount recovered after default is expressed as a fraction of the exposure at 
default and the average historical recovery rate is assumed to be 40%, meaning on 
average bondholders will be able to recover 40% of the sum loaned to the firm 
(Elkamhi et al 2014: 194). Bond’s seniority within the corporate capital structure is 
directly linked with the recovery rate. As seen on table 1.2, on average higher seniority 
grants higher recovery rate. 
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Table 1.2. Historical global recovery rates (1982-2014). 
 
Issuer-weighted Volume-weighted 
Lien Position 2014 1982-2014 2014 1982-2014 
1st Lien Bank Loan 78.4% 66.6% 80.6% 62.5% 
2nd Lien Bank Loan 10.5% 31.8% 10.5% 28.5% 
Sr. Unsecured Bank Loan n.a. 47.1% n.a. 40.2% 
Sr. Secured Bond 59.5% 52.8% 76.5% 52.4% 
Sr. Unsecured Bond 43.3% 37.4% 34.3% 33.6% 
Sr. Subordinated Bond 46.9% 31.1% 28.3% 26.0% 
Subordinated Bond 38.8% 31.4% 38.0% 26.3% 
Jr. Subordinated Bond n.a. 24.7% n.a. 17.1% 
Source: (Ou et al 2015: 7) 
Historically 1st lien bank loan has the highest recovery rate, thus being the safest form 
of corporate debt for an investor. Senior secured bonds, as seen in table 1.2, are the 
second safest form of corporate debt. The most common bonds, senior unsecured bonds, 
have a historical recovery rate of just 37.4% (issuer-weighted) or 33.6% (volume-
weighted). Thus the assumed historical bond recovery rate of 40% roughly holds true, 
when accounting for all of the bond lien positions. 
During company’s bankruptcy or liquidation, some bonds are ranked above other debt 
instruments and obligations. Firms issue various bonds with different seniority, which 
can be generally classified as senior or junior bonds. Senior bonds have a superior claim 
on the assets compared to junior bondholders. (Wang and Zhang, 2014: 784) In addition 
bonds, which are secured, rank above similar unsecured bonds. Altman and Kishore 
(1996) have classified bonds into five categories according to their seniority (from high 
to low): 
1) Senior secured (6.89%); 
2) Senior unsecured (74.15%); 
3) Senior subordinate (14.20%); 
4) Subordinate (0.12%); 
5) Junior subordinate (0.20%). 
Using the descriptive statistics from the study of 6,635 bonds conducted by Wang and 
Zhang (2014), the percentages to distribute bonds by seniority have been added by the 
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author. Of the 6,635 bonds studied, 74.15% of them were senior unsecured, which are 
by far the most commonly issued bonds on the market. Bondholders with the highest 
seniority receive their payments first, followed by those on the lower lever. Common 
owners of equity are the last to receive their payments. Also bond’s seniority is 
negatively correlated with bond’s yield; the lower the seniority, the higher the yield. 
Maturity of a bond is the period of time during which it remains outstanding. At 
maturity date bond issuer will repay the investor the original sum loaned. Bonds are 
often referred as to being short-term (up to 3 years), medium-term (4-10 years) or long-
term (more than 10 years). Baker et al (2003) find that the longer maturity a bond has, 
the higher its return is. In other words, the maturity of a bond is negatively related to the 
term spread. Tewari et al (2015) analyzed 4,495 corporate bonds issued between 1980 
and 2012, of which 1,033 were high yield issues. Maturity distribution showed that 
investment grade bonds are mostly issued as medium-term and long-term bonds and 
high yield bonds are mostly issued as short-term and medium-term bonds. Since high 
yield bonds carry higher risk of default, longer term bonds would include a considerable 
coupon premium to attract investors, making it too expensive for high yield issuers. 
Therefore high yield bonds are generally limited to short maturities. 
Newly issued high yield bonds have a noticeable variance in the spreads, which depend 
on different factors, mostly company-specific and environment-specific. In seeking to 
explain variance in the spreads, Fridson and Garman (1998) concluded in their study 
that high-yield bond’s yield spread will be greater the lower its senior-equivalent rating, 
the lower its seniority in the capital structure, the longer its maturity, and if it is callable 
prior to its maturity, if it is a zero coupon security, if it is the issuer’s first bond issued, 
or if it is underwritten by a commercial bank, all other things being equal. Also market 
environment will push the yield higher the wider the secondary market spread between 
BB and B corporate bonds is and if government bond yields rose in the month 
preceding issuance. Also, during the periods of recession the spread is seen to increase 
and during periods of expansion it decreases. Therefore bond’s yield spread is affected 
by several factors both issuers and investors need to account.  
An early paper by Fridson and Bersh (1994) presented an overview whether credit risk 
spread differences propose investment signals, in response to some investors who made 
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attempts to make investment decisions based on this. The authors contended that some 
investors might feel when the prevailing high yield bond yield spread is above its long-
term mean value, the bonds might be undervalued and should be bought and when the 
spread was below its long-term value, the bonds should be sold. They concluded that 
these allegations provide no support for using this investment decision rule and that the 
market self-corrects it almost instantly. Subsequently Reilly et al (2010: 204) examined 
the statistical properties of the credit risk spread of high yield bonds in order to 
conclude which factors should impact these spreads. The strongest impact came from a 
combination of default risk variables and capital market risks, mainly the volatility of 
small capital and New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stocks and the moving average of 
high yield bond volatility. This means that analysts and capital managers should 
consider the use of separate models with different variables when evaluating spreads for 
high yield bonds with different ratings. 
Bond covenants are designed to protect the interests of both investors and issuers. A 
restrictive bond covenant, included in the debt contract, is a provision that restricts the 
bond issuer from certain actions potentially detrimental to bondholders’ wealth after 
bond issuance (Cook et al 2014: 122). Covenants can include restrictions on financial 
activities (additional debt, negative pledge), investment activities (risky investments, 
mergers-consolidations) and payouts (dividends). To analyze the effect on negative 
covenants on bonds, Riesel (2014) studied 4,267 bonds issued by 1,302 companies. She 
found that small firms with low tangible assets, which have mostly a low credit rating, 
are more likely to include restrictive covenants. By contrast, investment grade firms 
with low leverage mostly avoid covenants as they may outweigh the benefits. Firms 
with high market-to-book value are also less likely to include negative covenants, 
especially negative pledge and restriction on investment activities. 
During the latest financial crisis in 2008 many investors suffered great losses as bonds 
issued before the crisis included fewer covenants. Liquidity and solvency components 
of financial distress had a significant effect on bond’s health. Cook et al (2014) studied 
the effects of liquidity and solvency risk on the inclusion of bond covenants by 
comparing the liquidity/bond covenant relationship during the pre-crisis, crisis and post-
crisis years. Liquidity reduces the likelihood of inclusion of restrictive bond covenants, 
16 
as financially healthy companies and high rated companies are more likely to meet their 
payments. During financial crisis, when a massive contraction in liquidity occurs, firms 
dependent on borrowing from credit market are forced to include restrictive covenants 
on bonds to attract and protect bondholders. The latest financial crisis of 2008-2009, 
with the bankruptcies of several financial institutions, increased investor’s concerns 
about the safety of bonds, and the importance of covenants. 
Alternate methods to moderate the impact of potential financial instabilities include 
structured provisions, like convertible provision and call provision. A convertible bond 
offers the investors the option to exchange it for a predetermined number of shares of 
the issuing firm at certain point in time (Ballotta and Kyriakou, 2015: 118) Convertible 
bonds usually offer lower rates because from the investor’s perspective a convertible 
bond adds both value and security. If the investor chooses not to convert the bond, then 
the bond acts as a straight bond. 
A call provision grants the issuer the right to buy back previously issued bonds before 
the maturity date. If the issuer decides to use the right to call the bond, the bondholder is 
usually compensated with an option premium, because the investor bears the risk to re-
invest the received cash. Hence, the price of the callable bond is always lower than the 
price of an equivalent straight bond. (Samet and Obay, 2014: 2) Tewari et al (2015) 
identify that the call premium in nonconvertible callable bonds acts as an effective 
protection against investors’ reinvestment risk, when the issuing firm’s credit rating 
improves and can suddenly issue bonds at a lower price. When interest rates are high, 
almost all investment grade issues and bonds with long maturities (>20 years) include a 
call premium. When interest rates are low, virtually all investment grade bonds issued 
during that time are callable at par. The data also suggests that while both investment 
grade bonds and high yield bonds include a call premium when interest rates are high, 
only high yield bonds include a call premium when interest rates are low (Ibid.: 352). 
Some callable bonds have also included a noncallable period, during which the bond 
can’t be redeemed early.  
The issue size of a bond can vary depending on the amount of cash required and the 
company’s rating. Usually companies with lower credit ratings, which are smaller in 
size and bear higher credit risk, can issue bonds smaller in size than larger companies 
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with high credit ratings. Based on the bond data from Bloomberg database, the average 
global corporate bond issue size is roughly €700 million and the average corporate bond 
issue size in the Nordic countries amounts to €100 million. To conclude this chapter, 
author has concentrated the main bond characteristics into the following table 1.3. 
 
Table 1.3. The distinction between investment grade bonds and high yield bonds. 
 
Characteristic Investment grade bonds High yield bonds 
Rating AAA to BBB- BB+ to C 
Issue size Above average (€700m globally, 
€100m in the Nordics) 
Below average 
Coupon Fixed or floating Fixed or floating 
Liquidity Less likely to become illiquid More likely to become illiquid 
Volatility Low High 
Maturity Medium-term to long-term 
(usually above 5 years) 
Short-term and medium-term 
(usually up to 5 years) 
Yield/spread Low/medium High 
Default probability Very low (<0.2%) Considerable (>2%) 
Recovery rate Depends on bond’s seniority, 
usually above 40% 
Depends on bond’s seniority, 
usually below 40% 
Covenants Less likely to include restrictive 
covenants, especially restrictions 
on investment activities 
More likely to include restrictive 
covenants (restrictions on financial 
activities, investment activities, 
payouts) 
Provisions Convertible provision; call 
provision mostly at par 
Convertible provision; call 
provision mostly at a premium 
Source: (Compiled by the author). 
High yield bonds are bonds with a credit rating below BBB- and investment grade 
bonds exceed that rating. High yield bonds are usually issued by firms smaller in size or 
acting in an uncertain environment. Compared to investment grade bonds, sub-
investment grade bonds are smaller in issue size, less liquid and bear more risk. 
Investors are thus compensated with higher yield or spread, which in turn is gaining 
more attention in current low interest rate environment. Due to the riskiness of high 
yield bonds, the chance of a default is considerably high, which in turn forces bond 
issuers to include restrictive covenants to protect investors. In the event of default, high 
yield bonds have generally lower recovery rate, i.e. how much the investor is able to 
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recover from the original sum loaned. Some bonds are convertible, which means they 
can be traded for a predetermined number of shares of the issuing firm at certain point 
in time. High yield bonds are more likely to be callable at a premium, which means the 
firm is able to call back their bonds after a certain amount of time by paying 
bondholders back the principal with a small premium. On the other hand, investment 
grade bonds are mostly callable on par, usually at any given time. 
 
1.2. The pricing of credit default swaps 
In the past 15 years, the credit default swaps have widely grown in popularity and its 
market has grown into a multi-trillion euro market with participants from nearly every 
sector in the financial world. Credit default swaps (CDSs) are derivative instruments 
which allow market participants to redistribute or transfer credit risk. The following 
chapter gives an overview of the nature of credit default swaps, including its benefits 
and costs. Given the liquid nature of the credit default swap market, CDS might also 
provide useful information about the credit market and its participants. Secondly, the 
issues and risks regarding credit default swaps arising from the recent financial crisis 
development are discussed. Finally, the different CDS pricing models and credit spreads 
discussed in this chapter give a deeper understanding of the nature of the credit default 
swaps. 
Credit default swap is a derivative contract aimed at transferring default risk of an 
underlying bond from one market participant to another. The protection seller assumes 
the credit risk of the underlying bond by committing to compensate the protection buyer 
for the loss suffered in case of the bond’s default, in return for a regular protection fee 
paid by the CDS buyer. After the default takes place, the seller makes a payment to the 
buyer equal to the notional value of the contract, and in turn receives defaulted bonds of 
equivalent notional value. (Schneider et al 2010: 1517) CDS can differ in the 
specification of the default payment. Possible alternatives are: physical delivery of the 
reference assets against repayment at par, notional minus post-default market value of 
the reference asset (cash settlement) and a pre-agreed fixed payoff, irrespective of the 
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recovery rate (Terzi, Ulucay 2011: 984). The previous is illustrated in the following 
figure 1.4, which shows the relationships between the parties. 
 
 
Figure 1.1. Schematic representation of a credit default swap (Compiled by the author). 
 
In a way, credit default swap is similar to conventional insurance. CDS is considered to 
be insurance against non-payment. A buyer might be speculating that there is a 
possibility that the third party will default. A key difference between a CDS and an 
insurance policy is those buying a CDS can trade in and out of their contracts, which is 
generally not possible in the insurance market. Insurance policies (i.e. property 
insurance or life insurance) are required to be sold by regulated entities and whoever 
purchases insurance must own the underlying asset. (Vogenbeck 2009: 2) As opposed 
to insurance, credit default swaps do not require an insurable interest in the reference 
entity. Depending on whether the company is in a bad situation and may soon default, 
investor owning bonds can buy or sell a CDS in order to make profit. Such ambitions do 
not hold true with insurance. 
Credit default swap trading has historically had a positive impact on bond market 
development. Evidence from Asia show that CDS trading improves bond market 
development by lowering average spreads and enhancing market liquidity, mostly 
before and in the early stages of a financial crisis. The main reason behind this positive 
impact is the bondholder’s ability to hedge their exposures much more easily and 
efficiently. In addition, credit default swaps facilitate the pricing of instruments by 
making it easier to reorganize risks and exploit arbitrage opportunities. (Shim and Zhu: 
2014: 472-473) Ashcraft and Santos (2009) evaluated the impact of CDS market on the 
cost of corporate debt, in order to confirm that CDSs have lowered the cost of debt 
Protection buyer Protection seller
Reference entity
(bond issuer)
Spread
Protection
(1 - recovery rate) x notional value
ExposurePossibility 
of default
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financing to firms by creating new hedging opportunities for investors. Contrary to 
popular opinions, they found that risky and informationally opaque firms appear to be 
adversely affected by the CDS market, while safe and transparent firms have benefited 
from a small reduction in both bond and bond loan spreads. It appears that credit default 
swap trading has a positive impact both on market level and firm level by providing 
better liquidity and lowering the costs of borrowing. 
In addition to financial benefits, credit default swaps can have both social benefits and 
costs. The social benefit is that CDS makes it easier for credit risks to be borne by those 
who are in the best position to bear them. Also CDS enables financial institutions to 
make loans they would not otherwise be able to make and the trading of CDS reveals 
useful information about credit risk. (Stulz 2009: 3) On the cost side, there is 
widespread recognition that CDS can give rise to market manipulations, especially 
when the market environment is not sufficiently transparent. In addition, CDS contracts 
might invite excessive speculation because of their relatively greater liquidity and 
higher degree of achievable leverage, and CDS can facilitate short-selling. (Anderson 
2010) Whether the social benefits outweigh the costs, it is still yet uncertain. 
Nevertheless an investor trading with CDS should familiarize himself with both benefits 
and costs. 
The recent financial crisis has brought attention to the forced sale of bonds. In the event 
of a shock, financial intermediaries (mutual funds, hedge funds, insurance companies) 
are forced to sell their underlying bonds due to different regulatory pressures. Massa 
and Zhang (2012) find that credit default swaps help to reduce the forced sale in bonds. 
CDS reduces the need of investors to liquidate their bonds in the face of credit 
deterioration, thus helping investors to protect their investments. The presence of CDS 
reduces yield spreads and increases liquidity, especially for investment grade bonds. 
Main event triggering forced sales by bond institutional investors is bond rating 
downgrade from investment grade to high yield grade (Ibid.: 5). Therefore during 
financial crises CDS helps to reduce risk contagion and guarantee bond’s liquidity.  
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After the recent financial crisis development, credit default swaps have come under 
increasing criticism. In May 2011, German regulators banned naked2 CDS positions in 
Eurozone sovereign bonds due to concerns over negative CDS effects in the sovereign 
bond market. In July 2011, The European Union Parliament also voted in favor of a 
similar ban on sovereign bond CDS positions. (Ismailescu and Phillips 2015: 43) Many 
observers have argued that credit default swaps trade in a largely unregulated over-the-
counter market as bilateral contracts involving counterparty risk and that they might 
facilitate speculation. What is more, the lack of transparency of the credit default swap 
market has made it possible for market participants to manipulate the market. (Stulz 
2009: 2-5) One such example is the American International Group (AIG), which 
insured more than $440 billion of fixed income investments. In September 2008, AIG 
went bankrupt due to the enormous exposure to CDS and the defaults of most of its 
insured bonds. (Xinzi 2013: 4-5) AIG failed to see the credit bubble crunch and was 
exposed to more risk than it could cover. 
Counterparty risk has emerged as one of the most important factors driving financial 
markets. Counterparty risk, also known as default risk, is the risk to each party of a 
contract that the counterparty will not fulfill its contractual obligations. After default 
events experienced by high profile institutions such as Lehman Brothers and Bear 
Stearns during the recent crisis, counterparty risk has emerged as a key problem in risk 
management (Bo, Capponi 2015: 29). When protection sellers are inadequately 
capitalized, counterparty risk in combination with lack of transparency and liquidity 
might act as a channel for systemic risk. Systemic risk is the possibility that an event 
could trigger severe instability or collapse an entire industry or economy. Therefore it is 
necessary to reduce the interconnectedness between the credit market parties. Loon and 
Zhong (2014) propose central clearing counterparty as a measure to reduce counterparty 
risk, which in turn reduces systemic risk. Central clearing counterparties are 
organizations (mainly banks), which help to facilitate trading done in bond and CDS 
markets. In addition they found that centrally cleared reference entities experienced an 
improvement in both liquidity and trading activity relative to noncleared entities. 
                                                 
2
 A CDS in which the buyer has no holdings or direct involvements in the underlying bond. 
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In the literature, the theoretical pricing of CDS has received a good amount of attention. 
There are two main approaches on how to price credit default swaps: structural models 
and reduced form models. Structural models, introduced by Black and Scholes (1973) 
and Merton (1974) assume that a firm defaults at the end of the period when the value 
of the firm’s assets is lower than a preset level. Black and Cox (1976) extended this 
approach allowing for default to occur at the first time when the firm's asset value drops 
below a certain threshold. The parameters of reduced form models are difficult to 
estimate because the bond’s volatility and market value are difficult to observe. 
Reduced form models, initially developed by Litterman and Iben (1991) and Jarrow and 
Turnbull (1995) no longer refer to the firm’s asset value process. Instead they determine 
credit risk by the occurrence of default and the amount recovered at default. In these 
models, default is usually represented by a random stopping time with a stochastic or 
deterministic arrival intensity and the recovery rate is assumed to be constant 
(Houweling, Vorst 2005). Thus default is treated as an unpredictable event and its 
outcome as a random jump process. Usually the reason for default is not specified. All 
the reduced form models, in one way or the other, rely on the estimation of a default 
probability. 
The empirical literature suggests that there is no need for structural models to separately 
model the hazard and recovery components of credit risk. Longstaff and Schwartz 
(1995) developed a credit derivative valuation model by incorporating bond’s credit 
spread as the main source of information. They found that the mean-reverting property 
of credit spreads has many important implications for the pricing, despite being an 
exogenous process. Duffie and Singleton (1999) focused on applications to the term 
structure of interest rates for bonds in order to value credit-spread options. Collin-
Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) developed a model with stationary leverage, which 
generates larger credit spreads for firms with low initial leverage ratios. By estimating 
the spread process, Cariboni and Schoutens (2004) assume that the asset price process is 
driven by a pure-jump Lévy process and default is triggered by the crossing of a preset 
barrier. Opposite to Gaussian process, which is based on the notion of the normal 
distribution, Lévy models can be asymmetric and are able to allow artificially 
introduced unexpected defaults. Yang et al (2014) incorporated the jump component, 
stochastic default barrier and the first passage time together into the valuation of CDS. 
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Contrast to the classical model, where an event of default is assumed to occur when the 
asset value of a firm crosses a constant barrier, they assume the asset price of the firm to 
follow a double exponential jump diffusion process, and the value of the debt is driven 
by a geometric Brownian motion. In conclusion CDS price with jump component is 
higher in longer maturities than CDS price without jump component and the price 
difference generally isn’t significant for maturities under one year. The previously 
discussed models have been summarized in the following figure 1.2, indicating their 
description and limitations. 
 
 
Figure 1.2. An overview of some of the CDS pricing models (Compiled by the author). 
 
CDS spreads, including its pricing, are affected by the underlying firm’s value, among 
others. When the market value of a firm decreases, hitting the default barrier becomes 
more likely and the probability of default increases. Since firm value is unobservable, it 
cannot be efficiently measured. Changes in the firm value are induced by changes in the 
Structural models Description Limitations
Merton (1974) A firm defaults at the end of maturity when the value of the firm’s 
assets are below a preset level. There are no market restrictions 
and transaction costs. Risk-free interest rate is constant in time. 
Firm's asset value follows a stochastic diffusion process and 
continuous trading is assumed in time.
Assumues too much simplicity. Default can 
only occur at the maturity of debt. Term 
structure of interest rate is stochastic in time. 
Firm's asset value is unobservable and needs 
to be estimated.
Black and Cox 
(1976)
Default occurs at the first time when the firm's asset value drops 
below a certain threshold. The model also takes into account 
safety covenants, debt subordination, and restrictions on the sale 
of assets.
Limited by the assumption of constant 
interest rates and absolute priority rules 
(creditor's claim has an absolute priority over 
a shareholder's claim).
Longstaff and 
Schwartz (1995)
The model allows interaction between default risk and interest 
rate risk by allowing stochastic interest rates. Also violations of 
the absolute priority are allowed.
Does not accurately describe the true 
behavior of the asset value, as sudden drops 
or jumps of a firm asset value are possible.
Collin-Dufresne and 
Goldstein (2001)
A structural model of default with stochastic interest rates that 
captures its mean-reverting behavior. In addition, firms adjust their 
capital structure to reflect changes in asset value and proceeds of 
new debt issuance are used to repurchase equity, leaving firm 
value unchanged.
Unable to capture the time-series behavior of 
both CDS spreads and equity volatility.
Yang, Pang and Jin 
(2014)
The asset price of a firm follows a double exponential jump 
diffusion process, the value of the debt is driven by a geometric 
Brownian motion, and the default barrier follows a continuous 
stochastic process.
Does not fit CDS term structure in the long 
term.
Reduced form Description Limitations
Litterman and Iben 
(1991)
Simple discrete time setting model, zero recovery assumed at 
default. Model uses three inputs: current term structure of riskless 
bond yields, current term structure of risky bond yields and 
evolution of riskless interest rates.
Recovery rates are not an input (100% loss 
in the event of default is assumed).
Jarrow and Turnbull 
(1995), Madan and 
Unal (1998), Duffie 
and Singleton (1999)
Possibility of default is allowed in the immediate future (hazard 
rate approach). Essentially an exogenous model for the hazard 
rate (likelyhood of the firm defaulting over the next period). Model 
generates realistic short maturity credit spreads.
Lack of structural definition of the default 
event. As a consequence, the resulting 
hazard rate model is reduced form with 
parameters that lack structural interpretation 
and offer no guidance in the presence of a 
structural change in firm specific variables.
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firm’s equity value and structural models imply that downward trends in the equity 
level are accompanied by upward trends in the CDS spread. Since firm value can be 
quite volatile over time, it is intuitive that hitting a default barrier becomes more likely 
when the firm value itself fluctuates widely. As firm value, so is equity volatility quite 
unobservable and they have to be approximated. (Alexander, Kaeck 2008: 1010) 
Structural models hold firm value and volatility as major input data; therefore these 
models suffer from a considerable drawback. In addition, Aunon-Nerin et al (2002) 
concluded that rating is the most important single source of information in the spread, 
although other factors, including interest rates, liquidity, stock prices, leverage, index 
returns and time-to-maturity, add significant information to CDS spreads as well. 
Changes in credit spreads are different depending on whether credit default swap 
spreads are observed before, during or after a financial crisis. In the light of the 2007-
2009 global financial crisis, Breitenfellner and Wagner (2012) examined risk factors 
that explain daily changes in aggregate CDS spreads in different economic situations. 
Before and after the crisis, spread changes are mostly determined by stock returns and 
implied stock market volatility. During the crisis, stock market returns lead spread 
changes, while after the crisis period a bidirectional relationship emerges. Thus they 
concluded that aggregate spread changes are quite informative for market participants, 
possibly measuring systemic risk. In addition, Blau and Roseman (2014) examined 
CDS spreads for nearly all European countries before and after August 5th, 2011 when 
the United States sovereign credit rating saw a downgrade. They found that while 
United States CDS spreads remained at relatively normal levels, European CDS spreads 
saw a sudden surge during the downgrade event. The reaction in the European CDS 
market began five days prior to the downgrade announcement and continued for 
approximately 10 days. The largest increase in CDS spreads was in European countries 
with the smallest GDP per capita and countries that had not recently been downgraded. 
Thus credit default swap spreads can sometimes anticipate unfavorable announcements 
and events.  
The second theoretical chapter gave a brief overview about credit default swaps and 
their pricing. A CDS is a derivative contract aimed at transferring default risk of an 
underlying bond from one market participant to another. One might find it similar to 
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insurance, because it basically insures bondholder against the company’s default. As 
opposed to insurance, credit default swaps do not require an insurable interest in the 
reference entity and they can be traded in and out of contract. CDSs can have financial 
benefits on the firms issuing bonds: they increase transparency, lower credit spreads and 
increase volatility, especially for firms who are issuing bonds for the first time. After 
the recent financial crisis development, credit default swaps have become under 
increasing criticism. Many observers have argued that credit default swaps trade in a 
largely unregulated over-the-counter market as bilateral contracts involving 
counterparty risk and that they might facilitate speculation. What is more, the lack of 
transparency of the credit default swap market has made it possible for market 
participants to manipulate the market, which largely caused the defaults of highly rated 
financial institutions such as AIG, Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. Literature 
suggests that there are two main approaches in pricing credit default swaps: structural 
models and reduced form models. Structural models assume that a firm defaults when 
its asset value drops below a certain threshold, while reduced form models no longer 
refer to the firm’s asset value process. Instead they determine credit risk by the 
occurrence of default and the amount recovered at default. 
 
1.3. The empirical evidence of credit spreads and credit risk 
underestimation 
The third part of theory gives an overview of the empirical evidence of credit spreads 
and credit risk underestimation. Relationships between credit default swap spreads and 
bond spreads and the linking determinants are examined. In addition, the different time 
periods and their segmentations used in some of the newest articles have been 
examined. 
First of all the dynamic relationship between CDS spreads and bond spreads needs to be 
explored. In order to perform an analysis, the data needs to follow the compliance 
criterion: 1-year CDS spread and 1-year bond spread, 5-year CDS spread and 5-year 
bond yield, 5-year CDS spread and firm’s 5-year probability of default etc. If the 
criterion is not met, the data needs to be interpolated or modeled to make it match. Forte 
and Peña (2009) examine the relationship between stock market implied credit spreads, 
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CDS spreads and bond spreads. In all cases of the analyzed 16 companies, the 
cointegration relationship appeared between CDS spreads and bond spreads. In about 
1/4 of cases, the CDS market led the bond market, whereas the opposite was true only 
in one case. At the same time, stock market led CDS market also in 1/4 of cases and the 
opposite was true in one case. The bond market seemed to lead the stock market in 1/3 
of cases according to the entire sample analysis. Surprisingly, these results do not 
translate into a clear evidence of leadership from the markets. Still the relationship 
between the CDS spreads and bond spreads was found very strong and they tend to 
increase or decrease together, with CDS spreads mostly in the lead. 
Since there is clearly a dynamic interrelation between corporate bond spreads and their 
respective credit default swap spreads, the link between government bond spreads and 
credit default swaps needs to be assessed as well. Similar to existing empirical studies, 
the CDS and government bond linkages are examined by Delis and Mylonidis (2011). 
Unlike the previous studies on corporate bonds, the data on 10-year government yield 
spreads and their underlying CDS are used, focusing on the four Southern European 
countries (Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain) during the sovereign debt crisis. The 
linkages have been examined with rolling Granger-causality tests, which allow for the 
emergence of a clearer picture of the possible dynamic linkages. The results suggest that 
during the whole five-year analysis period (2005-2010), CDS spreads almost uniformly 
Granger-cause bond spreads, especially after the start of the financial crisis. Feedback 
causality is detected during periods of financial and economic turmoil, thereby 
indicating the high risk aversion, which tends to perplex the transmission mechanism 
between CDS prices and government bond spreads. To a certain extent, the results can 
also be applied to corporate bonds. This demonstrates that CDS spreads and bond 
spreads are more linked during economic turmoil and other major credit events 
affecting the underlying entities. 
There are several determinants to explore the relationship with CDS spreads. In order to 
compare the pricing of credit risk in the bond market and the fast-growing credit default 
swap market, Zhu (2006) analyzed 24 CDS entities in the US, Europe and Asia. The 
panel data study and the vector error-correction model (VECM) analysis both suggest 
that the CDS market tends to move ahead of the bond market, and the liquidity factor 
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matters for the adjustment dynamics, particularly for US entities. Moreover, the study 
also finds that the market practice differs considerably between the United States and 
other regions, pointing to a certain degree of market segmentation. Surprisingly, the 
terms of a credit default swap contracts and the short-sale restriction in the cash market 
only have a very small impact. 
The same findings were later also confirmed by Blanco et al (2005), who provide 
evidence that credit default swap spreads may reflect changes in credit risk more 
accurately and quicker than corporate bond yield spreads. They concluded that the CDS 
market leads the bond market in determining the price of credit risk. What is more, 
macro variables (interest rates, term structure, equity market returns) have a larger 
immediate effect of credit spreads and firm specific equity returns and implied 
volatilities have a greater immediate effect on CDS prices. In other words, CDS spread 
should lead the changes in bond spread, being a better measure of risk. In the long run 
though, the empirical findings showed that bond spreads and CDS spreads move 
together, as theory predicts. This gives implications that the empirical part of this paper 
should show similar results, which means that actual CDS spreads extracted from 
database should lead CDS spreads calculated from bond spreads. 
Galil and Soffer (2011) linked CDS spreads with credit ratings to find out how CDS 
market responds to rating actions. In total, they explored a sample of 2866 rating 
announcements throughout the period between January 1, 2002 and June 30, 2006 and 
CDS spreads for more than 2000 entities during the period. They confirmed that CDS 
spreads change abnormally following announcements of rating changes and rating 
reviews. What is more, they were able to show for the first time that clustering of rating 
actions reflects the economic significance of developments in a firm’s credit quality. 
Generally the market response to bad news is stronger than to good news. A similar 
study was conducted by Wengner et al (2015) among 294 firms for the period 2004-
2011. For both upgrades and downgrades, statistically significant positive or negative 
cumulative abnormal changes were observed around the announcement dates. In 
addition to findings from the previous study by Galil and Soffer (2011), they found 
differences in the market reaction across industries and rating directions. Furthermore, 
the findings provided evidence that rating events affect competitors within the same 
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industry as well. This gives investors even more reason to analyze competitors as well 
upon bond purchases. 
Galil et al (2014) used a 718 US firm database to study the determinants of credit 
spreads from early 2002 to early 2013. They found that market variables, such as stock 
return, the change in stock volatility, and the change in the median CDS spread in the 
rating class, have the most explanatory power after controlling for firm-specific 
variables inspired by structural models. In the absence of these variables, other factors 
(change in spot rates, the change in the slope of the term structure) may also be used to 
explain the CDS changes. The structural models used for the analysis showed better 
results for investment grade firms than speculative grade firms. This result is in contrast 
to Avramov et al (2007), who had found that the structural models explain better credit 
spreads for high yield bonds. Though they used a different sample period (1990-2003 vs 
2002-2013) and the source of the spread data was from bonds instead of CDS, showing 
that different time periods and sources of spread data have a significant impact upon 
analyzing credit default swap spreads. 
A few years earlier, Ericsson et al (2009) concluded a similar study to investigate the 
relationship between theoretical determinants of default risk and actual CDS spreads. 
They used a dataset of bid and offer quotes credit default swaps from 1999-2002. These 
determinants, firm leverage, volatility, and the riskless interest rate, were found 
statistically significant and that their effect is economically important. According to 
their results, a 1% increase in annualized equity volatility raises the CDS spread by 1-2 
bps and a 1% change in the leverage ratio raises the CDS spread by 5-10 bps. These 
findings give approval for using the theoretical variables to calculate default risk. 
Corporate bond yield spreads are compensated for the various sources of risk, including 
default, systematic factors, default and taxes. Though the empirical studies conducted 
by Galil et al (2014) and Ericsson et al (2009) attempted to fully explain the 
determinants of the spreads, corporate bond yield spreads are still larger than can be 
explained by these known determinants of credit spreads. Several possible risk factors 
for this lack of explanation power have been put forward, such as illiquidity, systematic 
risk, tax effect, bond portfolio diversification etc. (Guo 2013:295).Thus the credit 
spread puzzle can’t be declared fully solved yet and a part of the dynamics of credit 
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spreads remain unexplained. In addition, some observations (e.g. Bushman et al 2010) 
provide strong empirical evidence to support the information-based credit risk models 
and ambiguity-based pricing models, which suggest credit spreads embed an 
information risk spread and ambiguity spread that are ignored by the traditional bond 
pricing models. At the center of these observations lie the shocks created by the bailout 
of Bear Stearns and liquidation of Lehman Brothers. As late as October 2007, or four 
months before the collapse, Bear Stearns CDS spreads were evolving smoothly like 
most other investment grade debt, when policy makers and industry participants were 
assuring us that the subprime crisis was contained (Li, Mizrach 2010: 1535). The credit 
risk was severely underestimated and just six months later after the March 2008 
collapse, things span out of control. 
Credit risk underestimation can be recalled as one of the reasons for the subprime crisis 
in the United States. As previously mentioned, policy makers and industry participants 
severely underestimated the subprime exposure of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, 
which resulted in credit risk underestimation. These are not the only examples, as the 
whole market mistook the underlying credit risk due to the booming economic situation. 
Investors were simply blind to the sequential increase in credit risk. (Ibid.: 1529-1531) 
Credit risk underestimation in bond market can for example be caused by wrong 
estimation of bond’s liquidity and firm’s debt maturity structures. Until recently, the 
credit rating agencies also tended to ignore the effects of firm’s debt maturity structures, 
which caused them to underestimate the maturity risk. In addition, due to the effect of 
liquidity on firm’s credit spreads, commonly used variables for default risk estimation 
such as the credit default swap spread may also absorb the intended liquidity effects and 
therefore cause credit risk underestimation. (He and Xiong 2012: 393-415)  
The collective use of the same credit risk valuation rules means the exogenous measures 
of risk underestimate the degree of endogenously created risk by investors buying and 
selling the bonds at the same time. Before the crisis of 2008-2009 pension funds and 
insurance companies outsourced their investments to firms that could not hold liquidity 
risk because of their short-term funding and use of market prices to measure risk and 
return. As liquidity risk suddenly increased, the investment firms were forced to sell 
these illiquid instruments, which led to the collapse in prices, forcing them to sell more. 
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(Underestimating Risk … 2015) The whole situation could have been prevented when 
the right people would have held the right assets, i.e. these illiquid assets were held by 
investors with long-term investment horizon.  
The premium in the asset prices can be decomposed into two components; a base 
premium that compensates the investors for the probability of default and an “excess” 
premium that compensates them for taking the risk of default. The literature has not 
widely considered the effect of investor’s characteristics, such as their risk aversion and 
financial performance, on the cost of financing. Lizarazo (2013) presented a model that 
analyzes the importance of investor’s characteristics in the determination of endogenous 
sovereign risk, interest rates, and capital inflows of emerging countries. The model’s 
results state that risk averse investors cause lower overall levels of volatility for the 
trade balance than risk neutral investors. Also, the credit spread volatility increases for 
risk averse investors for the year previous to default, while the credit spread volatility 
decreases for the year previous to default. Overall, the consideration of risk averse 
investors explained a large part of bond spreads and the behavior of borrowers and 
investors. The investor’s individual risk sentiment can therefore be a significant reason 
for credit risk underestimation (or overestimation), as risk neutral or risk seeking 
investors can severely underestimate credit risk prior to an event of default. Meanwhile, 
risk averse investors can handle the periods of high volatility in economy relatively 
better than investors with higher risk attitude.  
The global financial crisis of 2008-2009 and the period preceding the crisis have been 
rather extensively covered in the previous CDS spread analyses (e.g. Galil et al 2014, 
Narayan 2015, Wengner et al 2015, Han and Zhou 2015). Depending on the paper’s 
objective, authors either analyze the whole chosen time period or split it into several 
different periods. Galil et al (2014) applied their analysis on both the whole period 
(January 2002 to February 2013) and three different splits of the time period: before the 
global financial crisis, January 2002 to June 2007; during the global financial crisis, 
July 2007 to June 2009; and after the global financial crisis, July 2009 to February 
2013. A similar period segmentation was done by Narayan (2015), who split the time 
period of September 2004 to March 2012 into four different sub-samples, excluding the 
whole full-sample period. The four sub-samples are: from 9 September 2004 to 26 
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February 2007 the pre-crisis period; from 27 February 2007 to 31 December 2010 the 
crisis period; from 27 February 2008 to 14 September 2008 the pre-Lehman crisis 
period; and from 15 September 2008 to 31 December 2010 the post-Lehman crisis 
period. The last two sub-samples are assessing the impact of the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers, which is believed to have a significant effect on the analysis. If the time 
periods in the previous paper were consecutive, e.g. the three periods followed each 
other, then Narayan (2015) considered the latter two sub-samples to run simultaneously 
with the first two, but starting and ending at different times. In both of the previously 
mentioned cases, the segmented periods were first analyzed separately and then 
compared to each other, upon which the conclusions were drawn. 
On the other hand, Wengner et al (2015) included a single time period of 2004-2011 in 
their analysis. Although they described the data separately for each year, the data 
analysis was applied to the whole period. Instead of expanding the work by analyzing 
different consecutive time periods, they included six different sectors, upon which the 
conclusions were drawn. Similar approach was applied by Han and Zhou (2015), whose 
data covered the period of January 2001 to December 2012. Again, some descriptive 
analysis was conducted for some significant events, including periods before and during 
the crisis, but the analysis itself was applied to the whole time period. Overall the 
multitude of time sub-samples allow to analyze the CDS spread reactions to market 
conditions, which had happened during the sub-samples. This allows to gives a better 
overview of the CDS spread dynamics. The previously mentioned time period 
segmentation and its rationale have been summarized in the following table 1.4. 
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Table 1.4. The time periods analyzed by different authors. 
 
Author Time period Sub-periods Rationale 
Galil et al 
(2014) 
January 2002 
- February 
2013 
3: January 2002 - June 2007 
(before crisis); July 2007 - June 
2009 (crisis); July 2009 - February 
2013 (after the crisis). 
 To explain changes in CDS 
spreads more accurately and 
to compare the results 
between sub-periods. 
Narayan 
(2015) 
September 
2004 - March 
2012 
4: 9 September 2004 - 26 February 
2007 (before crisis); 27 February 
2007 - 31 December 2010 (crisis); 
27 February 2008 - 14 September 
2008 (before Lehman collapse); 15 
September 2008 - 31 December 
2010 (after Lehman collapse). 
To test whether spillover is 
time-varying and to account 
for the different CDS returns. 
Wengner et al 
(2015) 
January 2004 
- December 
2011 
None; data has been described 
separately for each year. 
Event-based analysis during 
the whole period; splitting 
period into sub-periods add no 
value. 
Han and Zhou 
(2015) 
January 2001 
- December 
2012 
None; the significance of some 
events has been highlighted 
separately. 
The objective is to analyze the 
determinants of the CDS slope 
during the whole period. 
Source: (compiled by the author). 
Interestingly enough various authors classify same periods of time differently. For 
example, according to Galil et al (2014) the global financial crisis started in July 2007 
and ended in June 2009. Narayan (2015) placed the crisis between 27 February 2007 
and 31 December 2010. Han and Zhou (2015) keep the crisis period as simple as 
possible, putting it between 2008 and 2009. Wengner et al (2015) explicitly controlled 
their dummy variables for crisis periods and stated the starting point of the crisis as 7 
February 2007, when the leading financial institutions such as HSBC announced that 
aggregate loan impairments and loss provisions would be substantially higher than 
expected because of deteriorating conditions in the US housing market. These findings 
suggest that the choice of time period sub-samples and their splitting depends on the 
source of the data and the author’s interpretation of the event. Although many papers 
base their time period segmentation upon previous and similar works, this can’t be 
always done, e.g. newer time periods which have not yet been comprehensively 
analyzed. 
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The previous chapter provides evidence to the widespread analysis of credit default 
swap spreads. Since their emergence in the 1990s, the dynamics of the CDS spreads 
have caught the attention of numerous researchers. The theory suggests that there is a 
distinctive link between CDS spreads and bond spreads, enabling to carry out the 
empirical analysis in the next chapter. CDS spreads reflect changes in credit risk more 
accurately and quicker than corporate bond yield spreads, being an important measure 
of risk. Also the CDS market often leads bond market in terms of reaction to market 
events, e.g. rating changes or sovereign debt crises. Credit risk underestimation can 
have severe consequences on the economy as whole, as happened in the United States 
prior to the financial crisis of 2008-2009. The reasons for credit risk underestimation on 
bond market, among others, can be caused by wrong estimation of bond’s liquidity and 
firm’s debt maturity structures. Also the literature suggests that risk neutral investors 
are more likely to underestimate credit risk than risk averse investors during the period 
before default. 
Each researcher has based the choice of the sample period on the availability of data 
and the presence of some important credit event, which in the latest papers has namely 
been the global financial crisis from 2008 to 2009. Although different researchers 
define the starting and ending point of the recent crisis differently, it tends to follow a 
certain trend in relation to credit events, e.g. the collapse of Lehman Brothers. One way 
to expand the reach of the analysis is to segment the analyzed time period. The number 
of sub-periods depends on whether the sub-periods are clearly distinguishable by some 
important credit event or whether segmentation provides additional value to the 
analysis.  
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2. THE COMPARISON OF MODEL ESTIMATED AND 
ACTUAL CREDIT DEFAULT SWAP SPREADS IN THE 
NORDIC COUNTRIES 
 
2.1. Market background and overview of the companies 
The following sub-chapter gives an overview of the current credit default swap market 
situation, introduces the model used to perform the analysis and explains the data and 
its background. In addition, the parameters used in the analysis are explained and the 
companies analyzed are divided into industry sectors. 
The economy in Europe has started to stagnate in the last few years. The 3 month 
Euribor index (Euro Interbank Offered Rate3) has never been negative and as low as it 
currently stands at -0.007% (as of 04.05.2015). Same depreciation has happened to 
currency indices in the Nordic countries, with the exception of Norway (see figure 2.1). 
The interbank offered rate is also indirectly linked with economic growth and inflation, 
as they tend to move together. Low interest rates are explained by the fall of inflation 
and by sluggish economic growth. ECB expansionary monetary policy program has 
accelerated the decrease in interbank market rates in the euro area. The low-interest-rate 
environment is expected to persist at least during the period of the ECB asset purchase 
program. At the same time, the market has become more positive about the recovery of 
interbank market interest rates. Besides the euro area, Denmark, Sweden and 
Switzerland have also introduced negative policy interest rates, and/or negative central 
bank deposit rates. (Mertsina 2015: 1) Thus investors are forced to accept lower yields 
in the low inflation environment. 
                                                 
3
 Interbank offered rate is the rate at which a bank is willing to lend the domestic currency (Euro 
for Europe, Swedish krona for Sweden etc.) to a prime bank for maturities from 1 week to 12 
months on an unsecured basis. 
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The negative interbank offered rates in the Eurozone, Sweden and Denmark have 
created an interesting situation, where floating rate bonds can yield a negative interest, 
which means that theoretically the investor has to pay the company/government for 
holding their bonds. Same can be true for mortgage loans, which generally have a low 
interest rate linked to the interbank offered rate. In practice a bond only establishes a 
one sided claim between the parties and there has never been an intention of the parties 
of any payment going in the other direction. Therefore in the Nordic countries the 
investors have not had to pay the issuer of the bond due to the negative yield. Also 
many new issuers are applying explicit interest rate floors for their bonds to avoid 
negative bond yields. 
 
 
Figure 2.1. 3 month interbank offered rates for Euro, Swedish krona, Norwegian krona 
and Danish krona from January 2010 to March 2015 (Bloomberg database, compiled by 
the author). 
 
The 3 month interbank offered rates seen in figure 2.1 are also an important part of the 
bonds used in the analysis. As explained in the theoretical part of the thesis, bonds can 
either have a fixed or a floating interest rate. Floating interest rate incorporates a fixed 
part and a floating part, which is the 3 month interbank offered rate. The floating rate 
bonds issued in late 2011, when the interbank offered rates were highest in the last five 
years, have seen a significant decrease in their yields and spreads. 
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Since the occurrence of the credit default swap in the 1990s, its pricing has been widely 
analyzed. The CDS market has further grown over the last decade and has thus become 
more prominent in the financial literature. Several studies, including Blanco et al (2005) 
and Zhu (2006) have studied the relationship between bond credit spreads and CDS 
spreads. A majority of the studies have been performed within a database of United 
States firms, with time periods ranging from 5 to 20 years. Since United States 
comprises the largest financial market in the world, researchers have mostly solely 
focused on that market. 
In this paper, the author focuses on the companies originating from the Nordic 
countries. The Nordic countries are a geographical and cultural region in Northern 
Europe and the North Atlantic, consisting of five countries (Norway, Sweden, 
Denmark, Finland, and Iceland). Since Iceland has no relevant companies issuing 5-year 
CDS, the country has been excluded. The reasons the Nordic countries were chosen to 
analyze are the geographic proximity to author’s location, the similarity of business 
culture and the lack of similar currently available studies in this region. Contrary to 
most of the CDS spread analyses, the author has included three different industry 
sectors, which are analyzed separately. The three industry sectors are: industrials, 
materials and utilities. This allows to carry out a cross-sector analysis, which might 
produce some relevant results. Other sectors (consumer discretionary, consumer staples, 
financials, energy, healthcare, information technology, telecommunication services) 
were excluded due to the small firm sample size, lack of bonds available with spread 
data or incompatibility with the chosen sectors. 
In the past 15 years, of the total 4132 corporate non-financial bonds issued in the Nordic 
countries 1568 were issued in Sweden, 1856 in Norway, 426 in Finland, 258 in 
Denmark and 24 in Iceland. The average issue amount for the period is €100 million 
and the average coupon is 4.15%. The issuance of corporate non-financial bonds in the 
Nordic countries has skyrocketed in the past few years, though the issued volumes are 
starting to decline (refer to figure 2.2). During the first half of the 2000s, the trend has 
been quite stable. After the financial crisis of 2008-2009, Nordic corporations were in a 
higher need of capital, thus issuing more bonds. For a corporation, bonds as a source of 
capital often offer lower interest expenses than bank loans, making them a desirable 
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source of cash. In the past few years, investors have been showing more interest in 
bonds because they offer a considerable higher margin than safe government bonds or 
bank deposit rates. 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Corporate non-financial bond issuance volumes in the Nordic countries 
from 2000 to Q1 2015 (Bloomberg Database; author’s calculations). 
 
For each firm in the analysis, the 5-year CDS spreads are observed. Although there are 
also 1-year, 2-year, 3-year, 7-year and 10-year CDS spreads available, the 5-year CDS 
spread is by far the most common and liquid of them all. Also since the Nordic 
companies are not so liquid than mostly previously analyzed big US corporations, the 
other CDS spread maturities are simply not available for most of them. The CDS spread 
data is extracted from the Bloomberg database daily. 
The aim of this paper is to compare the calculated and actual CDS spreads, in order to 
find evidence credit risk over- or underestimation compared to theoretical spread across 
three different sectors. Thus the CDS spreads of the companies originating from the 
Nordic countries between January 2010 and March 2015 are analyzed. The author 
evaluates the linkage between calculated and actual CDS spreads, inspired by reduced 
form models. A framework similar to that used in Hull et al (2005) is used estimate the 
CDS spreads. The choice in favor of the reduced form model was made to avoid 
overcomplicating the data and analysis. The main inputs to the model are the bond 
credit spreads, which have been obtained from Bloomberg database. 
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Another important input to the model is recovery rate. Recovery rate is the extent to 
which the principal of the bond can be recovered after the event of a default. When the 
issuer files for bankruptcy, the ultimate recovery rate is the present value of cash and/or 
securities that the creditors actually receive when the issuer exits bankruptcy, typically 
1-2 years after the initial default date. In 2014, the recovery rates were for the most part 
correlated with the priority of claim in the capital structure, with higher priority of claim 
enjoying a higher average rate of recovery. The only exception was the senior 
subordinated bonds recovered at a slightly higher rate of 46.9% relative to the senior 
unsecured bonds’ 43.3%, though the senior subordinated average is based on only four 
defaults. (Ou et al 2015: 6-7) In the last 5 years, the recovery rates have been higher 
than the historical average (see table 1.2) by approximately 5%. Higher recovery rates 
increase investor confidence and also lower the corporate bond spreads by a small 
margin in the long run. The recovery rates for the period of empirical analysis are 
presented in table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.1. Defaulted corporate bond and loan recoveries 2010-2014. 
 
Lien Position 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2010-2014 
1st Lien Bank Loan 78.4% 75.1% 66.4% 70.9% 70.9% 69.4% 
Senior Secured Bond 60.9% 59.8% 51.2% 63.3% 62.5% 59.5% 
Senior Unsecured Bond 43.3% 43.8% 43.0% 41.3% 51.5% 45.3% 
Senior Subordinated Bond 46.9% 20.7% 33.7% 36.7% 37.5% 36.0% 
Subordinated Bond 38.8% 26.4% 37.3% 35.4% 33.7% 35.5% 
Junior Subordinated Bond n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
Source: (Ou et al 2015: 23) 
 
The most commonly issued bonds are senior unsecured bonds, followed by secured 
bonds. The historical average recovery rate is generally agreed to be 40%, which is 
confirmed by Moody’s Annual Default Study. Therefore the recovery rate used in the 
model is 40%, which can be regarded as a constant for all of the bonds.  
In total, 440 bonds with a maturity from January 2010 were included in the analysis. Of 
those bonds, 301 were priced and had historical spread data available. In this analysis, 
the bond spreads obtained from Bloomberg database are Z-spread mid prices, which in 
essence is the number of basis points that would have to be added to the spot yield 
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curve so that the bond's discounted cash flows equal the bond's present value. Whenever 
Z-spread was unavailable for a bond, Bloomberg Spread to Benchmark was used as an 
alternative spread measure. If the Bloomberg Spread to Benchmark was also 
unavailable, the bond was excluded from the analysis. The bond spread data is collected 
from January 1, 2010 to March 28, 2015. The spread frequency is daily, which, 
including weekends, makes 1913 possible spread figures per each bond. The bonds 
were issued by 16 different companies, divided into three previously mentioned 
industry sectors: industrials, materials and utilities. The data has been summarized by 
companies in table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2. Overview of the companies included in the analysis. 
 
Industry 
Sector 
Company Country 
of Origin 
Rating 
(S&P) 
No. of 
Bonds Total 
No. of Bonds 
Priced 
Industrials Assa Abloy AB Sweden A- 
(stable) 
28 13 
  Atlas Copco AB Sweden A 
(stable) 
10 10 
  Metso Corp. Finland BBB 
(stable) 
12 6 
  SKF (Svenska 
Kullagerfabriken AB) 
Sweden BBB+ 
(neg) 
10 8 
  Scania AB Sweden A- 
(stable) 
44 26 
  AB Volvo Sweden BBB 
(neg) 
116 74 
Materials 
(Paper & 
Pulp) 
Metsä Board Corp. Finland BB 
(stable) 
3 3 
Norske Skog (Norske 
Skogindustrier ASA) 
Norway CCC+ 
(neg) 
19 19 
  SCA (Svenska Cellulosa 
Aktiebolaget) 
Sweden A- 
(stable) 
8 8 
  Stora Enso Oyj Finland BB 
(stable) 
23 15 
  UPM-Kymmene Corp. Finland BB+ 
(stable) 
11 8 
Utilities DONG Energy A/S Denmark BBB+ 
(stable) 
13 13 
  E.ON Sverige AB Sweden A-  
(neg) 
35 28 
  Fortum Oyj Finland A-
(neg) 
21 19 
  Statnett SF Norway A+ 
(stable) 
35 16 
  Vattenfall AB Sweden A- 
(stable) 
52 35 
Source: (Bloomberg Database, author’s calculations) 
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Some companies were excluded from the analysis due to the small size of outstanding 
or recently matured bonds, or non-existent bond spread data. Since the materials 
industry sector contains only paper & forest products companies, the industry sector can 
be regarded as paper & pulp. Of the 16 companies included in the analysis, four are 
speculative grade (Metsä Board, Norske Skog, Stora Enso, UPM-Kymmene) and the 
rest 12 are investment grade companies. Since 4/5 companies in Paper & Pulp are sub-
investment grade, the whole sector can be regarded as high yield which means the CDS 
spreads in the sector should generally be higher than in the other two investment grade 
industry sectors. 
The bond spread and the recovery rate are then used in the model to calculate the bond’s 
1-year default rate, which can also be applied to the company. The average 1-year bond 
default rate for the 16 companies between the period of January 2010 and March 2015 
was: 
• Industrials – 0.70%; 
• Paper & Pulp – 8.32%; 
• Utilities – 1.08%; 
• Investment grade companies – 0.87%; 
• High yield companies – 10.20%. 
The calculated 1-year default rate figures are clearly above the historical average 1-year 
default rates between years 1920-2014, which according to Moody’s is for investment 
grade companies 0.15% and for high yield companies 2.83% (Ou et al 2015: 29-31). 
The large difference between probabilities of default calculated from bond prices and 
probabilities of default calculated from historical data is a common feature of credit 
markets. The main reason for this feature is the fact that bond traders do not base their 
prices for bonds only on the actuarial probability of default, but also build in an extra 
return to compensate for the risks they are bearing. The default probabilities calculated 
from historical data are also known as real-world default probabilities, and those 
calculated from bond prices are known as risk-neutral default probabilities. (Hull et al 
2005: 1) The historical annual global issuer-weighted default rates are presented in the 
following figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.3. Annual issuer-weighted global corporate default rates, 1920-2014 (Ou et al 
2015: 29-31). 
 
As it is apparent on the figure 2.3, the historical default rates for investment grade 
companies have stayed relatively low below 0.2% annually, with the exceptions during 
the economic crises when the default rates can rise above 0.5%. The default rates for 
speculative grade companies on the other hand fluctuate remarkably and can rise above 
10% during economic crises. The risk of default in high yield companies is thus 
considerable and investors need to account for this. 
To sum it up, credit default swaps are over-the-counter derivatives, which are mainly 
traded in New York or London. The daily CDS mid-market data used in the analysis is 
supplied by Bloomberg Database for all of the 16 companies. The data run from 1 
January 2010 to 28 March 2015. The pricing source used is the Bloomberg average 
intraday quotes, which is an average of quoted spreads in the past 24 hours. If there are 
more than 5 quotes, then the lowest and the highest quotes are excluded from the 
average. All CDS prices are for five years, which is by far the most liquid maturity in 
the CDS market. Some time series have missing values, which are replaced by values 
from other sources, if available. The data is split into three industry sectors: industrials 
(six investment grade companies), paper & pulp (five sub-investment grade companies) 
and utilities (five investment grade companies). In total the companies had 440 bonds 
available with maturity from January 2010, but only 301 of them were priced. Thus the 
study includes 301 bonds, which are analyzed in the next sub-chapter.  
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(1) 
2.2. The model and the long term relationship between actual 
and estimated credit default swap spreads 
The second empirical sub-chapter explains the model used to estimate credit default 
swap spreads for the three industry sectors. The CDS spreads are estimated for the 
whole sample from January 2010 to March 2015, containing a total of 1913 
observations for each industry sector. In addition, the presence of long term relationship 
between the actual CDS spreads and estimated CDS spreads is evaluated. In order to 
test for the long term relationship for the three industry sector CDS spreads, the six time 
series first need to be confirmed non-stationary by testing for the presence of a unit root. 
After that, the cointegration between the sector variables can be tested. Finally the 
stationary relationships between the time series are modeled with vector error-
correction model. The calculations have been conducted in statistics program Stata. 
The model used to estimate the CDS spreads is being examined below. First the implicit 
one year default rates from bond spreads are calculated. Then they are transformed into 
five year default rates. Finally the implicit spread for CDS can be calculated. The 
following formulas give an overview on how the credit default swap spreads are 
estimated. The first step of the estimation is done separately for each bond to find daily 
bond’s 1-year default rate. 
 =

(1 − )
×
1
10000
 
Where: 
bdi1y = daily implicit 1-year bond default rate 
Si = daily bond spread 
RR = recovery rate, fixed at 40% 
i = daily observations (from January 1 2010 to March 28 2015) 
Since some bonds showed negative yields during certain periods, the negative 1-year 
bond default rates are replaced with zero. The negative bond z-spreads indicate that the 
bond yields less than the virtually safe government bonds with the same maturity. If 
bonds can have negative spreads and yields, then the negative default rate on bonds or  
(1) 
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corporates is not possible. After that, the average 1-year corporate default rate is 
calculated by finding the average of implicit 1-year bond default rates for each 
company.  
 =
∑

 
Where:  
cdi1y = daily implicit 1-year corporate default rate 
bdi1y = daily implicit 1-year bond default rate 
k = number of bonds with available spread data per corporation 
As the next step, the 1-year corporate default rates are transformed into 5-year bond 
default rates. The 5-year corporate default rate needs to be calculated in order to match 
the tenor of 5-year actual CDS spreads. The estimation of 5-year CDS spreads is done 
with the 5-year default rates.  
 = 1 − 
×
 
Where: 
cdi5y = daily implicit 5-year corporate default rate 
cdi1y = daily implicit 1-year corporate default rate 
After this, the daily estimated CDS spreads can be calculated. The main components of 
the formula are the previously calculated daily implicit 5-year corporate default rate and 
the recovery rate, which has been fixed at an average historical level of 40%. The 
formula is exhibited below. 
 =	−	(1 − ) × (1 − ) × 2000 
Where: 
CDSie = daily estimated credit default swap spreads 
di5y = daily implicit 5-year corporate default rate 
RR = recovery rate, fixed at 40% 
(3) 
(4) 
(2) 
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Next the model estimated CDS spread and actual CDS spread are tested for 
cointegration. Two nonstationary time series are cointegrated if they tend to move 
together through time. Previous empirical studies (Blanco et al 2005, Delis and 
Mylonidis 2011) suggest that CDS spreads and bond spreads are linked and move 
together in time. The results also indicate that CDS spreads almost uniformly Granger-
cause bond spreads, especially after the start of the financial crisis. Feedback causality 
is detected during periods of financial and economic turmoil, thereby indicating the 
high risk aversion, which tends to perplex the transmission mechanism between CDS 
prices and bond spreads. 
In order to carry out the analysis, the individual time series need to contain a unit root. 
The null hypothesis is that the variable contains a unit root, and the alternative 
hypothesis states that the variable is either stationary or trend-stationary. Trend-
stationary implies that the time series’ variance is constant in time meanwhile the mean 
doesn’t have to be constant (in the case of stationary time series both the variance and 
mean are stationary). The test is done using Phillips-Perron test, which uses Newey-
West standard errors to account for serial correlation. The Phillips-Perron test involves 
fitting the regression model by ordinary least squares, and the results are used to 
calculate the test statistics. The test has been conducted for all the three industry sectors 
for both actual and model estimated CDS spreads. In total each dataset has 1913 daily 
observations from January 2010 to March 2015. Because the data does not exhibit a 
clear upward trend over time, the trend option has been excluded. Results at 1%, 5% 
and 10% critical value are presented below in table 2.3. 
 
Table 2.3. Phillips-Perron test for unit root. 
 
Test 
Statistic 
1% Critical 
Value 
5% Critical 
Value 
10% Critical 
Value Industry sector CDS Spreads 
Industrials Actual -1.47 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 
Calculated -2.20 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 
Paper & Pulp Actual -2.77 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 
Calculated -2.27 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 
Utilities Actual -1.95 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 
Calculated -2.57 -3.43 -2.86 -2.57 
Source: (Author’s calculations) 
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The table 2.3 contains the results for the interpolated critical values for Z(t). If the test 
statistic is greater than its critical value, then the null hypothesis can’t be rejected and 
the time series contains a unit root. Both industrials actual (-1.47) and calculated (-2.20) 
CDS spread test statistic is greater than its 1% (-3.43), 5% (-2.86) and 10% (-2.57) 
critical value, which means the null hypothesis stands and they contain a unit root. 
Paper & pulp actual CDS spread test statistic of -2.77 is smaller than its 10% critical 
value of -2.57, indicating that at 10% confidence level the series was created by a 
stationary process. Still though at 1% and 5% confidence level the null hypothesis can’t 
be rejected. Meanwhile paper & pulp calculated CDS spread test statistic at -2.27 is 
greater than all the critical values (at 1%, 5% and 10%), allowing to accept the null 
hypothesis. Utilities actual CDS spread test statistic of -1.95 exceeds its critical values 
at all levels. The null hypothesis has to be rejected for utilities calculated CDS spread 
dataset at 10% confidence level as well, because the test statistic of -2.57 is equal to its 
10% critical value of -2.57. 
By concluding the unit root test results, all the six datasets have a unit root at 5% 
confidence level. The test statistic exceeded all of its critical values for four datasets, 
indicating the existence of a unit root at 10% confidence level. Overall the prerequisites 
for the upcoming cointegration tests are met at 5% confidence level, which is sufficient 
for the completion of the analysis. The Phillips-Perron test results prove that all the time 
series included in the analysis are non-stationary. 
To test for the Johansen cointegration, an appropriate number of lags need to be chosen. 
Based on the nature of the data, a number of 12 maximum lag orders have been 
included in the test. The results of the lag order selection are presented below in table 
2.4.  
 
Table 2.4. Lag order selection statistics (preestimation). 
 
Industry sector 
Number of lags suggested by criteria 
FPE AIC HQIC SBIC Consensus 
Industrials 9 9 5 1 1, 5, 9 
Paper & Pulp 10 10 10 10 10 
Utilities 7 7 2 2 7 or 2 
Source: (Author’s calculations) 
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The FPE (final prediction error) and AIC (Akaike’s information criterion) estimate that 
nine lags should be included, while HQIC (Hannan and Quinn information criterion) 
estimate the inclusion of five lags and SBIC (Schwarz Bayesian information criterion) 
estimate the inclusion of one lag for the industrials industry sector. The result is clearer 
for paper & pulp sector, where all four likelihood-ratio tests suggest the inclusion of 10 
lags for the cointegration test. The test results for the utilities industry sector are split: 
FPE and AIC suggest the inclusion of seven lags, while HQIC and SBIC suggest the 
inclusion of two lags. Thus the optimal number of lags for industrials is either one, five 
or nine, paper & pulp 10, and utilities two or seven (all cases of lags should be analyzed 
separately). 
Whether the cointegration relationships should include trend and constant, should 
usually be tested with an ordinary linear regression. The dependent variable should be 
CDS estimated spreads and independent variables actual CDS spreads and time. If time 
is statistically significant, the cointegration relationship should also include trend and 
constant. Even though the test results indicate that time is statistically significant 
(p=0.00) for all the industry sectors, the trend and constant should not be included in the 
further analysis. The connection between the two time series analyzed, the actual CDS 
spreads and calculated CDS spreads, is estimated by using the calculated spreads to 
estimate their ability to forecast the actual value of the credit default swap spreads. By 
switching the trend or constant into the equation, it would in essence allow a systematic 
error when calculating the estimated credit default swap spreads. Thus the further 
analyses have been conducted without the inclusion of trend and constant. 
The cointegration is tested with Johansen test for cointegration. Independent variables 
are model estimated CDS spreads and actual CDS spreads, and maximum number of 
lags included is specified in table 2.4. The whole period from January 2010 to March 
2015 is included in the test. The test results are presented in table 2.5.  
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Table 2.5. Johansen test for cointegration for full period. 
 
Industry sector Maximum rank Eigenvalue Trace statistic 5% critical value 
Industrials 0 - 7.64* 12.53 
Lags=1 1 0.00 0.51 3.84 
1.2010-3.2015 2 0.00 - - 
Industrials 0 - 5.25* 12.53 
Lags=5 1 0.00 0.48 3.84 
1.2010-3.2015 2 0.00 - - 
Industrials 0 - 4.42* 12.53 
Lags=9 1 0.00 0.51 3.84 
1.2010-3.2015 2 0.00 - - 
Paper & Pulp 0 - 19.47 12.53 
Lags=10 1 0.01 0.25* 3.84 
1.2010-3.2015 2 0.00 - - 
Utilities 0 - 12.88 12.53 
Lags=2 1 0.00 0.09* 3.84 
1.2010-3.2015 2 0.00 - - 
Utilities 0 - 8.10* 12.53 
Lags=7 1 0.00 0.02 3.84 
1.2010-3.2015 2 0.00 - - 
Source: (Author’s calculations) 
Johansen test for cointegration tests whether there are 0, 1 or 2 cointegration 
relationships. For any given value of r (rank) when the value of trace statistic is larger 
than the 5% critical value, is evidence against the null hypothesis that there is r or fewer 
cointegrating relations in the vector error-correction model. The “*” by the trace 
statistic indicates that this is the value of r selected by Johansen’s multiple-trace test 
procedure. The eigenvalue shown in the last line of table 2.4 is used to compute the 
trace statistic in the preceding line. The hypotheses of the trace statistics are: 
• H0: There are no more than r cointegrating relations. 
• H1: There are more than r cointegrating relations. 
In the case of industrials, the trace statistic at r = 0 of 7.64 for one lag is below its 
critical value of 12.53 which means the null hypothesis can’t be rejected. The trace 
statistic is also below its critical value for five lags (5.25) and nine lags (4.42). Thus 
model estimates the industrial CDS spreads and actual CDS spreads are not 
cointegrated. On the other hand, the paper & pulp trace statistic at r = 0 of 19.47 is 
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above its critical value of 12.53, the null hypothesis will be rejected. Therefore the 
model estimated paper & pulp CDS spreads and actual CDS spreads are cointegrated 
and the alternative hypothesis is accepted. Also the utilities’ trace statistic at r = 0 of 
12.88 exceeds its critical value of 12.53, so the null hypothesis of no cointegrating 
equations is rejected for two lags. In the case of seven lags, the utilities’ null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected as the trace statistic at r = 0 of 8.10 is below its critical value of 
12.53. 
Because Johansen’s method for estimating r is to accept the first r for which the null 
hypothesis is not rejected, the r = 1 is accepted as the estimated number of cointegrating 
equations between paper & pulp model estimated CDS spreads and actual CDS spreads 
with 10 lags and between utilities’ estimated spreads and actual spreads with two lags. 
It’s also worth to note that paper & pulp sector had cointegration relationships for all 
the lags between 1 and 10, while industrials had cointegration relationships up to two 
lags. The number of lags usually also affect the value of trace statistic. Less lags used in 
the analysis usually equals to higher value of trace statistic, which indicates a stronger 
cointegration relationship. In this case a switch to less lags did not cause any major 
changes in the strength of relationship, so the optimal number of lags are used. 
Meanwhile industrials industry sector has no cointegrating equations in the whole 
sample period for all suggested one, five and nine lags, thus the null hypothesis is not 
rejected at r = 0. 
Next the cointegration for industrials is tested for two sub-periods extracted from the 
whole period. The sub-periods chosen for industrials are from January 2010 to July 
2011 and from January 2013 to March 2015. The choice of the time periods was made 
by examining figure 2.5 to find for periods of interest. The time periods and the results 
of the lag order selection are presented below in table 2.6.  
 
Table 2.6. Lag order selection statistics (preestimation) for industrials sub-samples. 
 
Industry sector Time period 
Number of lags suggested by criteria 
FPE AIC HQIC SBIC Consensus 
Industrials 1.2010-7.2011 9 9 2 2 9 or 2 
1.2013-3.2015 4 4 1 1 4 or 1 
Source: (Author’s calculations) 
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For the period of January 2010 to July 2011, the cointegration for industrials has been 
tested for both two lags and nine lags. In the case of two lags, the trace statistic at r = 0 
of 12.64 exceeds its critical value of 12.53, so the null hypothesis is rejected. For the 
same period with 9 lags the null hypothesis can’t be rejected as the trace statistic is 
below its critical value. The second sub-period, from January 2013 to March 2015, 
comprised also a choice between two number of lags, 4 and 1. Testing cointegration for 
both cases resulted in the acceptance of the null hypothesis for four lags, but was 
rejected for one lag: the trace statistic of 12.84 at r = 0 for one lag exceeded its critical 
value of 12.53. Thus the null hypothesis for both sub-samples with two and one lags 
was rejected and there is one or fewer cointegrating equation. The results of the tests for 
industrials sub-periods can be found in table 2.7. 
 
Table 2.7. Johansen test for cointegration for industrials sub-periods. 
 
Industry sector Maximum rank Eigenvalue Trace statistic 5% critical value 
Industrials 0 - 12.64 12.53 
Lags=2 1 0.00 0.51* 3.84 
1.2010-7.2011 2 0.00 - - 
Industrials 0 - 12.87 12.53 
Lags=1 1 0.00 0.48* 3.84 
1.2013-3.2015 2 0.00 - - 
Source: (Author’s calculations) 
As previous results indicate, the cointegration relationships exist for all the sectors, but 
not for the same periods. Utilities and paper & pulp were the two industry sector which 
had a cointegrating relationship for the whole period. Industrials failed to show 
significant results for the whole period. Nevertheless two sub-periods from industrials 
have been analyzed separately, which show relevant results. The sub-periods span from 
January 2010 to July 2011 and from January 2013 to July 2015. 
Vector error-correction models (VECM) are used to model the stationary relationships 
between multiple time series that contain unit roots. VECM implements Johansen’s 
approach for estimating the parameters. Since the two credit spreads in an industry 
sector are cointegrated, albeit on different time periods, the parameters of a bivariate 
VECM with one cointegrating relationship are estimated. The estimation can only be 
done for time periods with cointegrating relationships, which are listed previously 
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through this paragraph. The estimated parameters of bivariate vector error-correction 
models with one cointegrating relationship are presented below in table 2.8. 
 
Table 2.8. Parameters estimated by vector error-correction model. 
 
Sector Variables Coefficient Std. Err. z P>|z| 
Industrials Actual CDS spreads 1 - - - 
1.2010-7.2011 Calculated CDS spreads -1.11 0.06 -16.38 0.00 
Lags=2, r=1      
Industrials Actual CDS spreads 1 - - - 
1.2013-3.2015 Calculated CDS spreads -0.86 0.03 -25.81 0.00 
Lags=1, r=1      
Paper & Pulp Actual CDS spreads 1 - - - 
1.2010-3.2015 Calculated CDS spreads -1.18 0.03 -29.77 0.00 
Lags=10, r=1      
Utilities Actual CDS spreads 1 - - - 
1.2010-3.2015 Calculated CDS spreads -0.99 0.44 -22.06 0.00 
Lags=2, r=1      
Source: (Author’s calculations) 
The coefficients found in the VECM show how deviations from the long-run 
relationship affect the changes in the variable in the next period. In the case of paper & 
pulp, the long term cointegrating relationship can be expressed as:  
• Actual CDS spreads – 1.18 × Calculated CDS spreads = 0; or  
• Actual CDS spreads = 1.18 × Calculated CDS spreads. 
When the coefficient’ value is smaller than -1, the estimated gap between the actual 
CDS spreads and estimated CDS spreads will be greater relative to the value that 
emerges from the measured gap, and when the coefficient’s value is greater than -1, the 
estimated gap would be smaller. So the results forecast a slight increase in credit spread 
difference in the next period for paper & pulp. For utilities, the long term cointegrating 
relationship coefficient of -0.99 estimates a quite similar movement for actual CDS 
spreads based on estimated CDS spreads. No major surprises in long term relationship 
for industrials can also be detected: for the period from January 2010 to July 2011 the 
long term relationship coefficient of -1.11 estimates some increase in credit spread 
difference, and for the period from January 2013 to March 2015 the VECM coefficient 
of -0.86 estimates a slight decrease in the credit spreads in the next period.  
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The previous sub-chapter explained the model used to calculate the estimated credit 
default swap spreads. In essence, the model estimates 1-year bond default rates, which 
are transformed into 5-year corporate default rates and finally the credit default swaps 
can be estimated. Phillips-Perron test confirmed that all the six time series used in the 
analysis contain a unit root and therefore are nonstationary. In order to test for 
cointegrating relationships between the sector spreads, a number of appropriate lags 
were chosen. Cointegration itself determines long-run relationships between the 
variables. The Johansen test for cointegration revealed a cointegrating relationship for 
the whole period of January 2010 – March 2015 for paper & pulp and utilities industry 
sectors. For industrials, a cointegrating relationship was found for two sub-samples, 
spanning from January 2010 to July 2011 and January 2013 to March 2015. Finally, 
vector error-correction model was used to show how deviations from the long-run 
relationship affect the changes in the next period. For paper & pulp the spread gap is 
expected to widen in the next period, while for utilities it is estimated to stay the same. 
Industrials spread gap is expected to converge even more in the next period. The graphs 
portraying the historical actual and estimated spreads for three industry sectors can be 
found in the next sub-chapter.  
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2.3. Model estimated and actual credit default swaps across 
three industry sectors 
The final sub-chapter discusses the difference between market pricing of credit default 
swaps and the implicit spread, which are in principle governed by bond pricing. After 
that the results arising from the spread differences are discussed, and finally concluding 
remarks are presented. 
The risk sentiment has remained quite stable in the Nordic CDS universe in the past few 
years. Compared to the European CDS indices, the Nordic high yield and investment 
grade credit default swap spreads have followed different trends. The figure 2.4 shows 
that before 2013 the risk sentiment in the Nordic investment grade companies has 
generally stayed below the European average, then after 2013 the Nordic IG CDS 
spread has started to converge with the iTraxx Main index. The iTraxx Main (Markit 
iTraxx Europe index) comprises 125 equally weighted credit default swaps on 
investment grade European corporate entities. This illustrates lower perceived risk in 
the years 2010-2013 in the Nordic investment grade companies compared to the other 
European entities. Thereafter the credit default swap spreads have started to converge 
and remain nearly identical. 
 
 
Figure 2.4. Nordic investment grade and high yield corporates CDS spreads in 
comparison to market indices (Compiled by the author). 
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Nordic high yield CDS spreads have moved in an opposite manner to Nordic 
investment grade CDS spreads compared to market indices. The spreads moved 
together at a roughly same level until mid-2011, when the Nordic high yield CDS 
spreads overreacted to the combination of sovereign debt crisis and the ECB actions. 
According to iTraxx Crossover index, the increased risk in the other European high 
yield companies was seen smaller than in the Nordic countries. The iTraxx Crossover 
(Markit iTraxx Europe Crossover) index comprises 75 equally weighted credit default 
swaps on the most liquid sub-investment grade European entities. Since 2012, the 
Nordic high yield CDS spread detached from the iTraxx Crossover index and has 
remained above 500 bps, whereas the iTraxx index indicates that the risk sentiment in 
the other European high yield entities is significantly lower than in the Nordic high 
yield entities. 
The following actual CDS spreads and model estimated CDS spreads have been 
analyzed for credit risk over- and underestimation. Statistically significant conclusions 
can be drawn upon the cointegrated time series, which were determined in the previous 
sub-chapter. As can be seen on the figure 2.5, the industrials model estimated CDS 
spread has deviated to a great extent from the actual CDS spread. The both spreads 
started at roughly 90 bps in the beginning of 2010, after which the estimated CDS 
spread gradually dropped to a significantly lower level. Until July 2011, the difference 
between market pricing of CDS and the calculated implicit CDS spread has been getting 
wider. The period of January 2010 to July 2011 can be regarded as post-crisis economic 
recovery, during which the economy in Europe regained its ground and achieved higher 
levels of output. The spread difference indicates the much lower investor’s risk 
perception during the period. It can be assumed that investors saw Nordic investment 
grade industrial corporate bonds a safe place to place their funds. Meanwhile banks had 
a different view on the credit risk, as the credit default swaps which they sold were 
relatively more expensive than in the investor’s view. The phenomenon can partially be 
explained by the recovering economic situation after the global financial crisis in 2008-
2009, during which industrials suffered slightly more than companies in other industry 
sectors due to diminishing orders and demand. 
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Figure 2.5. Industrials actual and model estimated CDS spreads (Compiled by the 
author). 
 
In April 2011, the European Central Bank raised interest rates for the first time since 
2008 from 1% to 1.25% and in July further to 1.50%. A few months later, the European 
sovereign debt crisis, mainly caused by Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Italy, 
escalated. The rise in actual CDS spreads by more than 70 bps can be best explained by 
the combination of the two previously mentioned events. It is also clear that the increase 
of spreads in estimated credit default swaps did not react this much to this news, 
indicating investors’ clear confidence in the Nordic industrials bonds.  
After the sovereign debt crisis in the end of 2011, the industrials actual credit default 
swap spreads have been gradually declining from 140 bps in January 2012 to 60 bps in 
March 2015, while the estimated credit default swap spreads have historically from 
December 2010 stayed between 20 bps and 60 bps. From 2013 January, the difference 
between estimated and actual spreads is starting to decrease. What is more, a 
convergence between the market pricing of CDS and implicit estimated spread can be 
observed. The investor’s credit risk underestimation between January 2013 and March 
2015 still exists, albeit from January 2015 the market pricing of CDS and the investor’s 
implicit spread can be viewed to be roughly at the same level. What is more, the 
parameter estimated by vector error-correction model also confirms a slight 
convergence of the two spreads in the next period. This may indicate that investor’s 
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confidence in this industry sector is getting weaker, while the market and banks are 
gradually lowering their risk perception associated with Nordic industrial companies.  
Unlike in the industrials industry sector, model estimated CDS spreads in paper & pulp 
sector (see figure 2.6) have followed the actual CDS spreads relatively well in line until 
the credit event caused by a combination of European sovereign debt crisis and ECB 
actions. The market priced credit default swap spreads and implicit estimated credit 
default swap spreads share a common stochastic drift in the period from January 2010 
to March 2015, as proven by the cointegration analysis. During the period from January 
2010 to mid-2011 the model estimates that investors share a common level of risk 
perception with the market and the banks issuing credit default swaps. No serious 
under-or overestimation of credit risk can be detected. 
 
 
Figure 2.6. Paper & Pulp actual and model estimated CDS spreads (Compiled by the 
author). 
 
Paper & pulp, being the only speculative grade sector out of the three industry sectors, 
offers the greatest yield possibilities, but at the cost of an increased risk of default. 
During mid-2011, the actual CDS spreads increased by more than 100% to 1000 bps, 
showing the sectors high volatility response to negative credit events. The difference in 
reaction between the bond market and the CDS market show a clear variance in risk 
perception to market affecting credit events. What is more, the bond market did not 
react to the credit event so dramatically, while banks viewed the credit risk a few 
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notches higher. Thus the investors perceived the increase of credit risk smaller than was 
viewed by the market. 
From mid-2012 a slight difference between market pricing of CDS and implicit 
estimated spread can be found in paper & pulp spreads. The spread difference persists 
and can still be noticed three years later in March 2015. The relatively constant three-
year spread difference indicates a slight long-term investor’s credit risk underestimation 
against the risk level priced by the CDS market. According to the results of VECM, the 
gap between the actual CDS spreads and estimated CDS spreads is expected to increase 
in the next period. It can be assumed that in the long term the investors are satisfied 
with bond returns and performance in the paper & pulp sector and they are willing to 
sacrifice some safety for the increased yield, ignoring the actual higher risk level 
dictated by the CDS market. Overall the theoretical implicit spread and actual CDS 
spread are well aligned indicating that the fairly high risk is priced in in this cyclical and 
low rated sector. 
Utilities, the industry sector with the lowest spreads in the analysis, show also the least 
volatility in the five year period. As seen on figure 2.7, the actual CDS spread and 
model estimated CDS spread start at the same level around 50 bps from January 2010. 
The market priced CDS and the implicit estimated spread follow approximately the 
same trend until mid-2011, where the difference in reaction to the negative credit event 
is noticeable. Bond market shows signs of credit risk underestimation compared to the 
credit risk interpreted by the CDS market. What is interesting is that all the three 
industry sectors bond markets view of credit risk during the credit event caused by the 
combination of European sovereign debt and ECB actions is lower than the risk 
perceived by the CDS market. So in general CDS market prices the credit risk higher 
during credit events, while bond market remains less affected by the events. Thus the 
investors underestimate the level of credit risk, which is governed by banks. 
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Figure 2.7. Utilities actual and model estimated CDS spreads (Compiled by the author). 
 
Utilities was one of two industry sectors with a cointegrating relationship between the 
estimated and actual CDS spreads for the whole period of analysis, spanning from 
January 2010 to March 2015. From mid-2012, the difference between market pricing of 
CDS and implicit estimated spread is starting to expand. The bond market perceives the 
credit risk one notch higher than it is perceived by the CDS market. While the actual 
CDS spreads gradually slowly decline from 80 bps to 55 bps in the 3-year period from 
mid-2012 to March 2015, the estimated CDS spreads show a slight upward trend from 
the start of 2014. The divergence continues to a spread difference of 20 bps at the end of 
March 2015. For some reason, bond market slightly overestimates the credit risk in the 
utilities industry sector during the three year period from mid-2012 to March 2015. The 
gap between the actual CDS spreads and estimated CDS spreads is estimated to remain 
unchanged also in the next period, as can be judged by the results of the vector error-
correction model in the previous sub-chapter. In conclusion, the implicit estimated 
spread being above the market priced CDS spread indict a slightly above actual risk 
sentiment among investors in this stable, non-cyclical sector. Utilities are perceived to 
be the industry sector with the lowest risk of default besides the “risk-free” government 
sector, providing relatively low yield on the bonds compared to other industry sectors. 
To sum it up, the results have been aggregated into a table for a better overview. 
Relevant conclusions have been drawn in line with the cointegrated samples determined 
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in the previous sub-chapter. The overview of investor’s risk sentiment in the Nordic 
countries can be found in table 2.9. 
Table 2.9. Summary of the investor’s risk sentiment in the Nordic countries. 
 
Industry Sector Sample period Conclusions 
Industrials 1.2010-7.2011 The gradually widening credit spread difference 
indicates the bond market's underestimation of the 
credit risk perceived by the CDS market. 
 
1.2013-3.2015 Noticeable credit risk underestimation by investors, 
albeit the convergence of spreads between the bond 
market and the CDS market towards 2015 show 
signs of integration of the risk sentiment. 
Paper & Pulp 1.2010-3.2015 Implicit estimated spreads well in line with market 
pricing of CDS, showing no signs of noticeable 
credit risk underestimation until mid-2011. From 
mid-2012, a relatively constant difference in reaction 
to credit risk between the bond market and the CDS 
market imply a slight long-term investor’s credit risk 
underestimation against the risk level priced by the 
CDS market. 
Utilities 1.2010-3.2015 Until mid-2011 the market priced CDS and the 
implicit estimated spread follow approximately the 
same trend, indicating similar risk sentiment 
between investors and banks. From mid-2012 the 
difference between the spreads starts to expand, with 
bond market slightly overestimating the level of 
credit risk priced by the CDS market. 
Source: (Compiled by the author). 
 
The analysis concludes that some investor credit risk under- and overestimation exists 
in the Nordic bond market. The biggest difference between market pricing of CDS and 
implicit estimated spread exists in industrials, where the investor’s risk perception is 
much lower than it is considered by the CDS market dictated by banks. Statistically 
significant investor credit risk underestimation exists during the period of economic 
recovery (January 2010 – July 2011) and from January 2013 to March 2015, although a 
convergence of the spreads can be seen towards the first quarter of 2015 in the second 
period. The reaction to credit risk between the bond market and the CDS market is 
relatively in line for paper & pulp during the period of economic recovery. However 
from mid-2012 a relatively constant difference in credit spreads is noticeable, which 
implies a slight long-term investor’s credit risk underestimation against the risk 
sentiment in the CDS market. In the utilities industry sector, the market pricing of CDS 
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and the implicit estimated spreads exhibit investor’s slight overestimation of credit risk 
from mid-2012 onwards. The difference in spreads show signs of widening towards the 
first quarter of 2015, hinting at investor’s continuing underestimation of credit risk in 
the relatively safe utilities industry sector. 
It’s also worth noting that the bond market is more regional and the CDS market is 
“London” based. Due to this, the investors view on the credit risk in local bond market 
might differ from the risks perceived by banks issuing credit default swaps. Investors 
risk sentiment covers mainly the region where the bond is issued, whereas banks usually 
price credit risk taking into consideration also the broader economic situation. Thus the 
differences in risk perception can partly be explained by the regionality of the bond 
market in the Nordic countries, while CDS trading takes mainly place in London. 
In conclusion, the evidence to investor’s credit risk underestimation was discovered. In 
addition, a case of credit risk overestimation was also found. The industrials industry 
sector, comprising of six investment grade Nordic companies, shows clear signs of 
investor’s credit risk underestimation in comparison to the view of CDS market. Paper 
& pulp sector, the only sub-investment grade sector in the analysis comprising of five 
companies, display signs of long-term investor’s credit risk underestimation against the 
risk level priced by the CDS market. Evidence to significant credit risk overestimation 
was found only in the utilities industry sector, which consists of five investment grade 
companies in the Nordic countries.  
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CONCLUSION 
This paper has found evidence to investor’s underestimation of credit risk in the Nordic 
countries between the period of January 2010 and March 2015. The specific results 
have been summarized for three different industry sectors, which are industrials, paper 
& pulp and utilities. Thus the main purpose of the thesis has been achieved. The results 
indicate that credit risk underestimation exists for:  
• Industrials (between January 2010 and July 2011), where the widening credit 
spread difference indicate the bond market's underestimation of the credit risk 
perceived by the CDS market; 
• Industrials (between January 2013 and March 2015), where credit risk is 
noticeably underestimated by investors, albeit the convergence of spreads 
between the bond market and the CDS market towards 2015 show signs of 
integration of the risk sentiment; 
• Paper & pulp (from mid-2012 onwards), where relatively constant difference in 
reaction to credit risk between the bond market and the CDS market imply a 
slight long-term investor’s credit risk underestimation against the risk level 
priced by the CDS market. 
Evidence to credit risk overestimation was found for the utilities industry sector, in 
which investors overestimated the credit risk from mid-2012 as the difference between 
the spreads started to expand, with bond market slightly overestimating the level of 
credit risk priced by the CDS market. 
In order to the reach the main purpose of the thesis, six research tasks were formed in 
the introduction. The research tasks helped to reach the paper’s main goal and are 
outlined in the following paragraphs. 
First, a comparative overview of high grade and low grade bonds was given. Low grade 
bonds, which have an issuer credit rating below BBB-, are usually issued by firms 
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smaller in size or acting in an uncertain environment. Compared to high grade bonds, 
low grade bonds are smaller in issue size, less liquid and bear more risk. Investors are 
thus compensated with a higher yield spread to offset the higher risk of default. In 
addition the low grade bonds are more likely to become illiquid and the spread volatility 
is significantly higher than in high grade bonds. Due to the increased risk the low grade 
bonds yield, the chance of default is considerably higher than in high grade bonds, 
which in turn forces issuers to include restrictive covenants to protect investors.  
Secondly, the concept of credit default swaps was explained and the different credit 
default swap pricing models were compared. A credit default swap is a derivative 
contract aimed at transferring default risk of an underlying bond from one market 
participant to another. Credit default swaps can have financial benefits on the firms 
issuing bonds: they increase transparency, lower credit spreads and increase volatility, 
especially for firms which are issuing bonds for the first time. The pricing of credit 
default swaps can be mainly done with two different types of models: structural and 
reduced form. Structural models assume that a firm defaults when its asset value drops 
below a certain threshold, while reduced form models determine credit risk by the 
occurrence of default and the amount recovered at default. 
After that, credit spreads were analyzed in detail and an overview of the credit risk 
underestimation literature was given. The theory suggested that there is a distinctive 
link between credit default swap spreads and bond spreads, with credit default swap 
spreads often leading the bond spreads. This means that credit default swap spreads 
reflect changes in credit risk more accurately and quicker than corporate bond yield 
spreads, being an important measure of credit risk. Credit risk underestimation can have 
severe consequences on the economy as whole, as happened in the United States prior 
to the financial crisis of 2008-2009. The reasons for credit risk underestimation on bond 
market, among others, can be caused by wrong estimation of bond’s liquidity and firm’s 
debt maturity structures. Also the literature suggests that risk neutral investors are more 
likely to underestimate credit risk than risk averse investors during the period before 
default. In addition, the time period sub-samples were analyzed to see how different 
authors segment their samples. The findings suggested that the choice of time period 
sub-samples and their splitting depends on the source of the data and the author’s 
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interpretation of the important credit events, e.g. the recent global financial crisis of 
2008-2009. 
The first empirical sub-chapter explained the market background and gave an overview 
of the companies included in the analysis. The 3 month Euribor index has never been as 
low as it currently stands, which has created an interesting economic situation for the 
corporate debt market. The negative interbank offered rates in euro area, Sweden and 
Denmark have created a situation where floating rate bonds can yield a negative 
interest, meaning theoretically the investor has to pay the bond issuer for holding their 
bonds. The companies included in the analysis originated all from the Nordic countries 
and were analyzed in three industry sectors: industrials, paper & pulp and utilities. In 
total a number of 16 companies and 440 bonds with maturities from January 2010 were 
included in the analysis. 
Thereafter the model estimated credit default swap spreads and actual credit default 
swap spreads were analyzed across three industry sectors in the Nordic countries. The 
model used to estimate the CDS spreads was decomposed for a better understanding of 
the process. Phillips-Perron test concluded that all the six time series contain unit root, 
which enabled to test for cointegrating relationships between the actual and estimated 
CDS spreads for each industry sector. Cointegrating relationships were found for all the 
industry sectors, albeit on different sample periods. After that, the relationships were 
analyzed with vector error-correction model in order to model the stationary 
relationships between the time series. The coefficients found in the vector error-
correction model show how deviations from the long-run relationship affect the changes 
in the variable in the next period. 
Finally, the results were presented, analyzed and summarized. The analysis suggested 
that investor’s credit risk underestimation exists in the Nordic bond market. In addition, 
some overestimation of credit risk can be found as well. The biggest difference between 
market pricing of CDS and implicit estimated spread existed in industrials, where the 
spread difference indicated the much lower investor’s risk perception during the period. 
Meanwhile banks had a different view on the credit risk and did not view Nordic 
industrials as safe as investors did. The model estimated CDS spreads in paper & pulp 
sector followed the actual CDS spreads relatively well in line until mid-2011. The 
63 
relatively constant three-year spread difference from mid-2012 indicated a slight long-
term investor’s credit risk underestimation against the risk level priced by the CDS 
market. Utilities were perceived to be the industry sector with the lowest risk of default 
and the analysis concluded that investors slightly overestimated the credit risk priced by 
banks. 
The conclusions reached in this paper can help investors better understand the historical 
bond and CDS market development of the three industry sectors. In addition, the results 
may help investors to reach better investment decisions by advising them to avoid 
industry sectors with underestimated credit risk (industrials and paper & pulp) and to 
give considerations to look into industry sectors with overestimated credit risk 
(utilities). Though each investor has a different risk sentiment, the industrials and 
utilities are both in the same rating category. When the choice of bond purchase comes 
down to choosing between a Nordic industrial and a Nordic utilities company, the 
author suggests investing in utilities sector, as the overestimated credit risk offers better 
yield capabilities for the bonds. The limitations of the analysis include the shorter-than-
planned period of analysis due to the lack of available bond spread data between 2005 
and 2010 for Nordic corporations. In addition, the future papers could develop the 
analysis further by including additional industry sectors for a better overview of the 
Nordic market, or by conducting a deeper, more thorough analysis of two industry 
sectors. 
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RESÜMEE 
 
INVESTORI KREDIIDIRISKI ALAHINDAMINE PÕHJAMAADES 
Taavi Jürgenson 
Ülemaailmne finantskriis aastatel 2008-2009 tõstis esile krediidiriski hindamise 
tähtsuse. Ameerika Ühendriikidest alguse saanud finantsinstitutsioonide 
kokkukukkumine mõjutas negatiivselt ka ülejäänud maailma. Investorid olid 
maandanud oma võlakirjade riske krediidiriski vahetustehingutega (credit default  
swap – CDS), kuid vahetustehingute müüjate ebakompetentse riski hindamise tõttu ei 
suutnud need oma funktsiooni täita. Sellele vaatamata on pärast finantskriisi 
krediidiriski vahetustehingute turg ja võlakirjaturg jõudsalt kasvanud. Negatiivsete 
stsenaariumite kordumise vältimiseks peaksid investorid olema suutelised õigesti 
hindama võlakirjade alusvara krediidiriski. See on tähtis nii võlakirjaportfellide 
riskijuhtimiseks kui ka keskpankuritele, kellele annaks see täpsemat informatsiooni 
finantsturu hoiakute kohta. 
Alusvara krediidiriskiga kursis olemise üheks põhjuseks on, et ei korduks finantskriisile 
eelnenud aastatel aset leidnud krediidiriski alahindamine. Krediidiriski alahindamise 
põhjustena saab välja tuua näiteks võlakirjade likviidsuse ja ettevõtte võlastruktuuri 
küpsuse vale hindamise. Seetõttu tuleks analüüsida investorite riskitaluvust pärast 
ülemaailmset finantskriisi. Võlakirjade krediidiriski marginaalide (samaväärsete 
korporatsioonide ja valitsuse võlakirjade tootluse erinevus) ja krediidiriski 
vahetustehingute marginaalide vaheline tugev side annab aluse investorite krediidiriski 
üle- või alahindamise uurimiseks. Ühelt poolt määravad krediidiriski hinnataseme 
pangad (krediidiriski vahetustehingud) ja teiselt poolt investorid (võlakirjad). Õige riski 
hindamine ei oma tähtsust mitte ainult investorite seas, vaid ka majanduses tervikuna. 
Märkimisväärsed erinevused krediidiriski taseme tajus võivad krediidikvaliteeti 
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mõjutavate sündmuste ajendil põhjustada erinevatele osapooltele suuri kahjusid, mida 
saaks vältida. 
Käesoleva magistritöö eesmärgiks on leida tõendeid investorite krediidiriski 
alahindamise kohta, võrreldes hinnatud krediidiriski vahetustehingute marginaale 
tegelike krediidiriski vahetustehingute marginaalidega. Hinnatud krediidiriski 
vahetustehingute marginaalid on arvutatud võlakirjade marginaalide põhjal, mis 
omakorda on oluline investori riskitunnetuse näitaja. 
Eesmärgini jõudmiseks on püstitatud kuus uurimisülesannet. Järgnevad 
uurimisülesanded annavad kiire ülevaate käesoleva töö struktuurist ning aitavad jõuda 
töö eesmärgini. Uurimisülesanneteks on: 
1. Anda võrdlev ülevaade kõrge ja madala reitinguga võlakirjadest; 
2. Seletada lahti krediidiriski vahetustehingute kontseptsioon ja võrrelda 
krediidiriski vahetustehingute hindamise mudelid; 
3. Võtta kokku krediidiriski marginaalide analüüsimise meetodid ja tulemused ning 
anda ülevaade investori krediidiriski alahindamise käsitlustest; 
4. Anda ülevaade praegusest turusituatsioonist ja analüüsi kaasatud ettevõtetest; 
5. Analüüsida hinnatud ja tegelikke krediidiriski vahetustehingute marginaale 
Põhjamaades kolme sektori lõikes; 
6. Esitada kokkuvõtvalt analüüsi tulemused krediidiriski alahindamise kohta. 
Analüüsi kaasatud 16 ettevõtet on kõik pärit Põhjamaadest: 8 Rootsist, 5 Soomest, 2 
Norrast ning 1 Taanist. Need on jaotatud kolme erinevasse sektorisse: tööstusettevõtted, 
paberit ja tselluloosi tootvad ettevõtted ning kommunaalettevõtted. Analüüsis 
käsitletakse ajaperioodi jaanuar 2010 kuni märts 2015. Igal analüüsi kaasatud ettevõttel 
on vähemalt kolm eelnimetatud perioodil käibelolevat võlakirja. Võlakirjade ja 
krediidiriski vahetustehingute marginaalide andmed on saadud Bloombergi 
andmebaasist päevakaupa (k.a. nädalavahetused), mis teeb kokku 1913 võimalikku 
vaatlust iga võlakirja kohta.  
Krediidiriski vahetustehing on riski ülekande eesmärgil põhinev tuletistehing kahe 
osapoole vahel. Krediidiriski vahetustehinguid ostavad võlakirjade investorid pankadelt, 
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et kaitsta end võlakirju emiteerinud ettevõtte pankroti või sarnase krediidikvaliteeti 
mõjutava sündmuse eest. Krediidiriski vahetustehingud on loonud likviidse turu 
krediidiriski ülekandeks ja kauplemiseks ning seetõttu omavad nad suurt väärtust ka 
majandusele tervikuna. 
Töö põhiosa on jaotatud kaheks peatükiks: teoreetiline ja empiiriline. Teoreetiline osa 
koosneb kolmest alapeatükist, mis annavad ülevaate võlakirjadest, krediidiriski 
vahetustehingute hindamise mudelitest ja krediidiriski alahindamisest. Empiiriline osa 
kirjeldab turu hetkelist taustolukorda ja annab ülevaate töös käsitletud ettevõtetest. 
Lisaks sellele analüüsitakse aegridade sektoritesisest kointegratsiooni ning esitletakse 
tulemused. Järgnevalt on välja toodud lühikesed ülevaated töö põhiosadest. 
Esimene alapeatükk annab võrdleva ülevaate kõrge ja madala reitinguga võlakirjadest. 
Madala reitinguga võlakirju ehk rämpsvõlakirju, mille reiting on madalam kui BBB-, 
emiteerivad põhiliselt väiksema bilansimahuga või ebakindlas keskkonnas tegutsevad 
ettevõtted. Rämpsvõlakirjad on võrreldes kõrge reitinguga võlakirjadega (krediidireiting 
BBB- või kõrgem) väiksema emiteerimismahuga, madalama likviidsusega ning 
kannavad suuremat riski. Rämpsvõlakirjadesse investeeringu teinud investoreid 
premeeritakse kõrgema tootlusega, et tasakaalustada kõrgemat alusvara maksejõuetuse 
riski. Lisaks on rämpsvõlakirjadel suurem tõenäosus muutuda mittelikviidseks ning 
marginaali volatiilsus on tunduvalt suurem. Tänu kõrgemale maksejõuetuse riskile on 
rämpsvõlakirjade emitendid sunnitud lisama võlakirjadele kitsendavaid tingimusi 
investorite huvide kaitseks. 
Teisena seletatakse lahti krediidiriski vahetustehingute kontseptsioon ning võrreldakse 
nende hinnastamise mudeleid. Krediidiriski vahetustehingud, mille ülesandeks on 
krediidiriski ülekanne investorilt pangale, avaldavad positiivset mõju võlakirju 
emiteerivatele firmadele. Nad suurendavad ettevõtte võlastruktuuri läbipaistvust, 
alandavad krediidiriski marginaale ja tõstavad volatiilsust. Eriti just firmade puhul, kes 
emiteerivad võlakirju esmakordselt. Krediidiriski vahetustehingute hinnastamiseks on 
teaduskirjandus välja pakkunud kaks peamist mudelit: strukturaalne ja taandatud vormi 
mudel. Strukturaalsed mudelid eeldavad, et ettevõttel tekib maksejõuetus, kui selle 
varade väärtus langeb allapoole kindlat taset. Taandatud vormi mudelid mõõdavad 
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krediidiriski peamiselt maksejõuetuse tõenäosuse ja pankroti puhul investorile 
hüvitatava määra kaudu. 
Järgmisena analüüsitakse krediidiriski marginaale (credit spread) ning antakse ülevaade 
krediidiriski alahindamise käsitlustest. Teaduskirjandusest selgub, et krediidiriski 
vahetustehingute marginaalide ja võlakirjade marginaalide vahel on märgatav seos, 
mida enamasti juhivad krediidiriski vahetustehingute marginaalid. See tähendab, et 
krediidiriski vahetustehingute marginaalid suudavad muutusi krediidiriskis peegeldada 
palju täpsemalt ja kiiremini kui korporatsioonide võlakirjade marginaalid. Teisisõnu on 
krediidiriski vahetustehingute marginaalid krediidiriski olulised mõõdikud. 
Empiirilise osa esimene alapeatükk kirjeldab praegust turusituatsiooni ning annab 
ülevaate analüüsi kaasatud ettevõtetest. Kolme kuu Euribor pole kunagi nii madalal 
olnud, mistõttu on võlakirjaturul tekkinud vastuoluline olukord. Kolme kuu negatiivsed 
intressimäärad euroalas, Rootsis ja Taanis on esile kutsunud situatsiooni, mis teeb 
võimalikuks ujuva intressigamääraga võlakirjade negatiivse tootluse. Seega 
teoreetiliselt peaks investor maksma ettevõttele või valitsusele võlakirjade omamise 
eest. Reaalselt pole vastupidises suunas makseid Põhjamaades veel toimunud. 
Analüüsis on ettevõtted jaotatud kolme sektorisse (tööstusettevõtted, paberit ja 
tselluloosi tootvad ettevõtted ning kommunaalettevõtted), kaasatud on eelnimetatud 
ettevõtete 440 võlakirja, mille lõputähtaeg on hilisem kui jaanuar 2010. 
Töö viiendas alapeatükis analüüsitakse hinnatud ja tegelikke krediidiriski 
vahetustehingute marginaale kolme sektori lõikes. Esiteks kirjeldatakse krediidiriski 
vahetustehingute marginaalide hindamise mudelit, tuues välja hindamise protsessi 
sammud ja valemid. Seejärel tõendatakse Phillips-Perroni testiga aegridades ühikjuure 
olemasolu, mis on üheks eelduseks kointegratsioonianalüüsi läbiviimiseks. 
Kointegratsiooniseosed ilmnesid kõikide sektorite puhul: paberit ja tselluloosi tootvate 
ettevõtete ja kommunaalettevõtete puhul kogu valimi lõikes ning tööstusettevõtete 
puhul kahe osavalimi lõikes. Pärast seda analüüsitakse neid seoseid vektori 
veaparandusmudeliga, et modelleerida aegridade statsionaarseid suhteid. Vektori 
veaparandusmudeliga leitud koefitsiendid näitavad, kuidas on kõrvalekalded hinnatud ja 
tegelike krediidiriski vahetustehingute marginaalide pikaajalistes suhetes mõjutavad 
tegelike marginaalide kõverat järgmisel perioodil. 
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Viimases alapeatükis teostatakse hinnatud ja tegelike marginaalide graafikute põhjal 
tulemuste ülevaade. Analüüsi tulemusena võib kinnitada, et perioodil jaanuar 2010 kuni 
märts 2015 leidis Põhjamaades aset investorite krediidiriski alahindamine. Analüüsi 
tulemuste kohaselt esineb krediidiriski alahindamist järgnevatel juhtudel: 
• Tööstusettevõtetes (vahemikus jaanuar 2010 kuni juuli 2011), kus laienev 
krediidiriski marginaal tähistab võlakirjaturu krediidiriski alahindamist võrreldes 
krediidiriski vahetustehingute turuga; 
• Tööstusettevõtetes (vahemikus jaanuar 2013 kuni märts 2015), kus investorid 
märgatavalt alahindavad krediidiriski, kuigi nende marginaalide järk-järguline 
ühinemine perioodi lõpu poole näitab märke riskitunnetuse ühildumisest; 
• Paberit ja tselluloosi tootvates ettevõtetes (alates 2012 keskpaigast), kus on 
suhteliselt konstantne krediidiriski taju erinevus võlakirja- ja krediidiriski 
vahetustehingute turu vahel. See vihjab mõningasele investori pikaajalisele 
krediidiriski alahindamisele võrreldes pankade poolt krediidiriski 
vahetustehingute turu hinnastatud riskitasemega. 
Lisaks krediidiriski alahindamisele leitakse tõendeid ka krediidiriski ülehindamisest 
kommunaalettevõtete sektori puhul. Hinnatud ja tegelike krediidiriski marginaalide üha 
laienev vahe alates 2012 keskpaigast näitab, et võlakirjaturg ülehindab natuke 
krediidiriski taset võrreldes krediidiriski vahetustehingute turu hinnastatud 
riskitasemega. 
Käesolevas magistritöös leitud tulemused saaksid aidata Põhjamaade võlakirjadesse 
investeerivatel investoritel paremini mõista võlakirja- ja krediidiriski vahetustehingute 
turu arengut aastatel 2010 kuni 2015 kolmes sektoris: tööstusettevõtted, paberit ja 
tselluloosi tootvad ettevõtted ja kommunaalettevõtted. Lisaks sellele võivad tulemused 
aidata investoritel teha võlakirjade puhul paremaid investeerimisotsuseid. Nimelt tuleks 
investoritel vältida alahinnatud krediidiriskiga sektoreid, nagu seda on tööstusettevõtete 
ning paberit ja tselluloosi tootvate ettevõtete sektor. Investeerimisotsuseid tehes tuleks 
eelistada ülehinnatud krediidiriskiga sektoreid, nagu seda on kommunaalettevõtete 
sektor. Investorite erinevat riskitaluvuse taset silmas pidades asetsevad tööstusettevõtted 
ja kommunaalettevõtted samas reitingukategoorias. Seega kui investoril oleks valida 
võlakirjade ostuks eelnimetatud kaks sektorit Põhjamaades, soovitaks autor teha 
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võlakirjainvesteeringud kommunaalettevõtetesse, kuna sealne ülehinnatud krediidirisk 
pakub soodsamat võlakirjade tootluse ja maksejõuetuse tõenäosuse suhet. 
Töö piirangutena toob autor välja planeeritust lühema analüüsiperioodi, kuna 
vahemikus 2005 ja 2010 on Põhjamaade võlakirjade marginaalide andmestik puudulik. 
Samuti on selles vahemikus Põhjamaades emiteeritud võlakirjade maht tunduvalt 
väiksem, kui seda on viimase viie aasta jooksul. 
Tulevased tööd selles vallas võiksid kaasata analüüsi suurema arvu sektoreid, mis 
võimaldaks anda parema ülevaate Põhjamaade võlakirjaturust ja ajaloolisest 
krediidiriski tasemest. Alternatiivina võiks keskenduda ainult ühele sektorile ja viia läbi 
süvaanalüüs võrdluses sama sektoriga Lääne-Euroopas, kus saaks krediidiriski 
analüüsimisel arvesse võtta ka iga olulise finantsturgu mõjutanud sündmuse. See 
võimaldaks teostada võrdleva analüüsi investori riskitunnetuse kohta kahes Euroopa 
regioonis. 
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